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iABSTRACT
The question of this thesis is whether the individual can resolve the problem of
culture crisis in her own case. Culture crisis is a historical moment in which our
culture leads us to expect a world drastically di erent from the one in which we
find ourselves. This thesis will focus on the experience of Generation Y in the
fall-out of the 2008 Recession. It will be argued that we need a Wittgensteinian
view of language in order to account for the phenomenon of culture crisis. It will
be suggested that our individual has to be a Nietzschean individual in order to
resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Potential incompatibilities
between a Wittgensteinian view of language and the Nietzschean individual will be
considered and rejected. It will be concluded that in order to resolve the problem
of culture crisis in her own case the individual must change the way she lives.
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PREFACE
I’m feeling rough, I’m feeling raw, I’m in the prime of my life.
Let’s make some music, make some money, find some models for wives.
I’ll move to Paris, shoot some heroin, and fuck with the stars.
You man the island and the cocaine and the elegant cars.
This is our decision, to live fast and die young.
We’ve got the vision, now let’s have some fun.
Yeah, it’s overwhelming, but what else can we do.
Get jobs in o ces, and wake up for the morning commute.
. . .
There’s really nothing, nothing we can do
Love must be forgotten, life can always start up anew.
The models will have children, we’ll get a divorce
We’ll find some more models, everything must run its course.
We’ll choke on our vomit and that will be the end
We were fated to pretend
To pretend
We’re fated to pretend
To pretend1
1MGMT (2008)
1INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 2008 newspapers across the nation were splashed with headlines
announcing the $700 billion bank bailout. Coverage discussed failures in regula-
tory oversight and the ethical shortcomings of the finance industry. In the weeks
and months following the announcement of the bailout, newspapers were heavy
with stories of the collapse of the housing market, mass lay-o s, and numerous
individuals who had become homeless essentially overnight.
Nearly five years later the discussion of the e ects of the Recession has
turned its attention to Generation Y. By and large the members of Generation
Y find themselves unable to build the kind of life they were taught to expect.
Many of the members of Generation Y are unable to find a job that pays a living
wage. They are burdened with tens of thousands of dollars of student loan debt.
They are unable to purchase cars, a ord to get married or have children. In short,
Generation Y entered the workforce and were immediately forced to put their lives
on hold.
Despite these set backs the members of Generation Y remain optimistic.
Surveys show that a majority of Generation Y believes they will be able to achieve
the kind of life and degree of success they want. These numbers hold even amongst
those who moved back in with their parents after graduating college or working
for a few years.
The question is whether this optimism will prove prescient or foolish. Nu-
merous forecasts suggest that Generation Y will be the first generation since the
2Depression that is worse o  than their parents. Jobs reports show that the econ-
omy is consistently adding jobs. However, a closer look shows that these jobs are
low-salary jobs rather than the mid-salary jobs that fund a middle-class life. The
combination of the growing wealth gap and the pressures of globalization indicate
that Generation Y’s optimism may be unfounded.
Many members of Generation Y are lightly revising their idea of the good
life. They wait a few more years to get married and have children. They rent or
buy small condos or houses in urban centers. They prefer living in dense, multi-use
areas so they can bike or walk where they need and forego car ownership altogether.
Such alterations, importantly, do not question the essential features or gen-
eral outline of the idea of the good life. Rather, they take for granted that the
economy just needs a few years to bounce back or that the individual just needs a
few more years to accumulate the necessary capital. These eventualities may not
happen. As such, continuing to be guided by an idea of the good life, but finding
themselves unable to attain it, the members of Generation Y may find themselves
fated to live unsatisfied and unfulfilling lives.
The immediate cause of this problem is economic in nature. However, the
aim of this thesis is to suggest that the problem itself is cultural. More specifically,
the problem is that the picture of the good life embedded in our political culture
is no longer attainable. In a post-Recession world, this picture only sets up the
individual for a life of dissatisfaction and failure. The problem is that the members
of Generation Y were given a picture of the good life that does not fit the post-
Recession world in which they find themselves.
Throughout this thesis I refer to this kind of phenomenon as “culture crisis.”
By “culture crisis,” I mean a moment in time in which our concepts do not fit the
3world in which we find ourselves. In the case of Generation Y, their picture of
the good life does not fit the post-Recession world. Other examples of culture
crisis-inducing events might include the Great Depression, World War II, and the
Vietnam War. Each of these events fundamentally challenged our ideas of how the
world is, what we can expect from others, or how we can expect our lives to go.
Though there are other examples of culture crisis, I will focus on the experience of
Generation Y as it is contemporaneous with the writing of this thesis.
The phenomenon of culture crisis presents a particular challenge. The im-
mediate cause of the culture crisis facing Generation Y was economic in nature.
This problem is political insofar as it concerns our political culture. Moreover, it
has had political repercussions both in the form of the global #Occupy movement
and as one of the defining issues of the 2012 presidential election. However, an
instance of culture crisis can be solved by neither economic or political means.
Culture crisis can only be solved by means of a change in culture.
This presents a problem for the individual. Culture is a collective creation.
It tends to change at a very slow, even evolutionary pace. But the individual
members of Generation Y have lives to live right now. If they are to have any
chance of living satisfied and fulfilled lives, these individuals will have to resolve
the problem of culture crisis in their own case as soon as possible. They have to
be able to free themselves of the pre-Recession picture of the good life and give
themselves a picture better suited to the post-Recession world. The question of
this thesis is whether this solution is conceptually possible.
4CULTURE CRISIS
In his acceptance speech at the 2012 Democratic National Convention, President
Obama told voters that they faced a clear choice between two fundamentally dif-
ferent visions for the future of America. He told us that we, as Americans “insist
on personal responsibility, and we celebrate individual initiative.” We celebrate the
individual and their achievements, but we do so with the recognition that “we have
responsibilities as well as rights; that our destinies are bound together.” America,
President Obama insisted, is not about what I can do, or what the government
can do for us, but rather “what can be done by us, together.” According to Presi-
dent Obama, America is a place where ambitious and innovative individuals come
together to achieve—together—and where the government is a means of pursuing
this goal.
Governor Romney’s acceptance speech at the 2012 Republican National
Convention painted a di erent picture of America. The individual was a theme
of Governor Romney’s speech as well, but the idea of government as a means of
pursuing collective goals was absent. In place of government, Governor Romney
invoked family, church, community, and business. He held up the worker who,
upon losing a well-paying full-time job with benefits, took two lower-paying jobs
with fewer benefits in order to support her family as a paragon of the hard-working,
heroic American. He appealed to the voter to consider whether she and her family
were better o  than they had been four years ago, implying that the government
was responsible for the continuing fall-out of the 2008 Recession. According to
5Governor Romney, America is a collection of hard-working individuals who find
whatever support, comfort, or redress they may need in local, non-governmental
associations.
Political rhetoric aside, President Obama was right. The candidates in the
2012 presidential election represented two di erent visions of America. It would
be a mistake, however, to think that these conflicting visions originated with the
2012 presidential election or that via the election the American public decided on
one vision over the other. The passion and enthusiasm displayed by both sides
during the campaign, as well as a look at the popular election results, shows a
highly divided American public. President Obama may have won the o ce, but
the American public as a whole has not adopted his vision.
In emphasizing the di erences between their visions for America, Presi-
dent Obama and Governor Romney ignored the commonalities that underlie those
visions. Talking about similarities is hardly the point of an election campaign.
However, while di erences may be what wins an election, examining what unites
us will help us to understand the appeal of these visions and also why the American
public is so divided about them. This chapter will undertake such an examination.
It will acquaint the reader with the notion of political culture, develop the idea
that political culture changes over time, and suggest that America is in the midst
of such a change. The chapter will end by introducing the problem that will be
the focus of this thesis.
WHAT IS POLITICAL CULTURE?
What President Obama and Governor Romney neglected to tell the American
public is that we are united by our political culture. “Political culture” is a term
6used by political theorists and scientists to refer to the shared norms and beliefs
that make a group of people into a political unit. In the case of the presidential
election, the political culture of interest was that set of norms and beliefs shared
by the people of the United States. However, we can also speak of political culture
at di erent levels and in di erent places. For instance, the state of New Hampshire
has a di erent political culture than the state of California or Oregon. As these
states belong to the same larger political unit, their respective political cultures will
be similar, but there are enough di erences among them that we might profitably
compare and contrast them.
The shared norms and beliefs that characterize a political culture consist of
some of the most basic values and assumptions we employ in our everyday lives.
Political culture limits the kinds of political institutions we find acceptable. It
informs how we think of ourselves and others. It shapes how we think others
should be treated and how we would like to be treated ourselves. Political culture
even provides a minimal picture of the good life. In providing our basic idea of
what a person is it also, thereby, provides a basic idea of what constitutes a good
and desirable life.2 Political culture, then, is fundamental to our sense of ourselves
as Americans and individuals. Moreover, understanding our political culture is
fundamental to understanding ourselves as Americans and individuals.
Though many of us may be unfamiliar with the notion of political culture,
we are all familiar with the features of our own. We believe that individuals are
2This is a controversial claim. The debate between moral liberals and political liberals con-
cerns the extent to which liberal political culture has moral or normative content. I’m taking for
granted here that political culture has some minimum of normative content. I think the descrip-
tive features of a concept come with complementary normative features. That is, what a thing is
tells us how it ought to be treated. If the liberal concept of “person” includes the characteristic
of “inherently valuable individual capable of setting her own goals and determining the course of
her own life” then we ought to treat persons as such.
7inherently valuable and the basic unit of society. We believe individuals are capable
of making their own decisions, setting their own goals, and determining the course
of their own lives, and we believe they should be treated as such. We believe that
all persons are equal and should be treated equally. We believe that all persons
have certain rights, including the right to property, and that these rights should
be protected. It is these shared norms and beliefs that unite us as Americans.
ARE THE TIMES A-CHANGIN’?
It is a commonplace that the United States is a liberal country. It is also widely
assumed that the United States has always been a liberal country. However, just as
political culture can vary between di erent places, it can also vary between di erent
times. When Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat and political sociologist,
came to the United States in 1831 to examine democracy, he witnessed a very
di erent country than the one we know today. There were the obvious di erences:
the frontier had yet to be settled, slavery was still practiced, women and African
Americans were not allowed to vote. However, taking Tocqueville’s account as
more or less accurate reveals that the United States was at that time characterized
by a republican political culture. It was precisely this republican political culture,
what Tocqueville referred to as our “mores,” that he thought kept the dangers of
democracy and a potential power grab by the federal government at bay.3
One explanation of America’s transformation from a republican to a liberal
country has been suggested by Frederick Turner. In his Significance of the Frontier
in American History, Turner advances what has come to be referred to as the
“Turner Frontier Thesis.” According to the thesis, the United States became a
3de Tocqueville (1969), 287, 397.
8liberal country as a result of its confrontation with the frontier. In expanding
into and settling the frontier Americans left behind social ties, community, and
politics. In their place grew the increased sense of self-reliance and individualism
that characterizes American political culture today.
The Frontier Thesis finds some support in Tocqueville’s study of America.
Though Tocqueville emphasizes the republican nature of American political cul-
ture, the careful reader will notice that he holds up New England as the exemplar
region. In contrast to New England, Tocqueville is less impressed by the West-
ern and Southwestern regions. He finds the people there less educated, less in
the grip of the republican mores he identifies, and he is appalled by their elected
representatives.4 Nonetheless, Tocqueville seems confident that the Western and
Southwestern regions will come to resemble New England more and more as they
develop.5 The pioneer, as Tocqueville sees him, is a man bringing civilization
and democracy to the wilderness.6 He is certain (or perhaps hopeful) that the
resemblance will not be the other way around. However, if the Frontier Thesis is
correct, Tocqueville simply and understandably underestimated the influence the
confrontation with the frontier would have on American political culture.
According to the Frontier Thesis, then, a republican America plunged into
the frontier and a liberal America came out the other side. This liberal political
culture has shaped our identity, our society, and our political life. But this isn’t
the end of the story of American political culture. On the contrary, Craig Carr in
his Polity suggests that we are currently facing political challenges that will have
a potentially fundamental e ect on our political culture. How extreme the change
4de Tocqueville (1969), 200.
5de Tocqueville (1969), 308.
6de Tocqueville (1969), 302-303.
9is, Carr warns, is up to us.
Carr identifies the source of this change in the increasingly intricate prob-
lems we need government to address. Whereas Tocqueville came to the United
States to study democracy, Carr argues that the functions we need government to
perform nowadays are so numerous and complicated that a government substan-
tially resembling democracy in its ideal form is simply not up to the task.7 Rather,
out of political necessity we will need to turn to the bureau as the most e cient
means of dealing with our “large-scale social problems.”8 Carr refers to this as the
“bureaucratic phenomenon.”9
The bureaucratic phenomenon foreshadows a shift in our political culture.
Initially, this shift will be due to an inherent tension between American liberal
political culture and the nature of the bureau as an organizational structure. The
source of this tension is Americans’ fervent, almost religious celebration of the in-
dividual. Carr refers to this as the “myth of radical individualism.”10 We value
individuals who are self-made, who play by their own rules, and control events
around them. Carr describes this as a “myth” to emphasize the fact that it doesn’t
correspond to reality. No individual is truly self-made. What an individual man-
ages to accomplish in her life is largely determined by the circumstances in which
she finds herself.11 Due to our radical individualism, we celebrate non-conformity
as valuable in and of itself. But non-conformity does not work within the struc-
ture of the bureau. A bureau has a central task that is pursued collectively by the
individuals who make it up. There’s no room for playing by your own rules in the
7Carr (2007), 150, 179-199.
8Carr (2007), 154, 159.
9Carr (2007), 154.
10Carr (2007), 205.
11This myth, incidentally, was nicely reflected in the 2012 Republican National Convention
slogan “We built it.”
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bureau.
Despite this initial tension, the bureau as an organizational structure is
not inherently at odds with liberal political culture. Carr argues that our radical
individualism has simply been tacked onto liberal political culture in the United
States.12 He notes that historically American political culture has predisposed us
to favor decentralized, libertarian forms of government. However, he argues that
such forms of government are not the only ones consistent with liberal political
culture.13 Further, decentralized forms of government are no longer adequate to
e ectively address the large-scale social problems of today. The turn to the bureau
means, one way or another, we will have to abandon our radical individualism.
The structure of the bureau is not inherently at odds with liberal political
culture. However, the bureau comes with its own culture which is. The basic as-
sumptions and values of bureaucratic culture are inconsistent with those of liberal
political culture.14 Whereas liberal political culture takes the individual to be the
basic unit of society, bureaucratic culture takes the organization to be the basic
unit. Whereas liberal political culture is egalitarian, bureaucratic culture is ine-
galitarian and hierarchical. Whereas liberal political culture believes individuals
have inherent value and their identity is theirs to determine, bureaucratic culture
believes the value and identity of an individual is determined by their role within
the organization.15 Carr prescribes greater popular working knowledge of our po-
litical culture to prevent it being replaced by the antithetical bureaucratic culture.
Barring such an awakening among the American public, however, the bureaucratic
phenomenon means we are in for a radical shift in political culture.
12Carr (2007), 205.
13Carr (2007), 96-97.
14Carr (2007), 207.
15Carr (2007), 169-174.
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Faced with such a prospect, the temptation is to suggest that we ditch the
bureau. Afterall, our political culture shapes our identities and values. Surely
that’s more important than any problem we might need to address? But Carr
argues there’s no stopping increasing centralization and bureaucratization. Bu-
reaucracies have a tendency to grow even if their function does not change.16
Bureaucracies may also simply adopt new functions, as Carr illustrates with the
example of the history of the FBI.17 Bureaucracies, once created, either grow or
stay the same, but they don’t go away. Moreover, there’s no avoiding centralization
and bureaucratization. Carr refers to this as the “centralization paradox.” Accord-
ing to the centralization paradox, decentralized behavior requires centralization in
order to manage the externalities created and the more decentralized behavior,
the more centralization is needed.18 Centralization begets more centralization and
decentralization begets centralization, as well.
Carr’s suggestion that we are headed for a shift in political culture insti-
gated by the necessity of the bureau is borne out by the 2012 presidential election.
President Obama’s and Governor Romney’s respective visions of America are sim-
ply two responses to the bureaucratic phenomenon. Governor Romney’s small
government vision of America reflects our continued fascination with libertarian-
type forms of government. President Obama’s vision, on the other hand, reflects
a setting aside of radical individualism and an attempt to harness the power of
the bureau to address our large-scale social problems. The debate between Pres-
ident Obama and Governor Romney, then, comes down to whether our historic,
liberal insistence on individual self-su ciency and decentralization is adequate to
16Carr (2007), 159.
17Carr (2007), 165-166.
18Carr (2007), 96-97.
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meet the needs of today or whether we can both adopt the bureau and retain our
political culture, our values, and national identity.
Carr’s suggestion also explains the passion and enthusiasm exhibited by the
American public during the election. The two visions get to the very heart of what
it means to be American. They recommend di erent ideas of acceptable political
institutions. They o er di erent visions of how we might think of ourselves and
each other. They o er di erent visions of the kinds of lives we should desire.
The fact that the popular vote was fairly evenly split, however, indicates that
we haven’t reached consensus on how we feel about the bureau or whether we’re
ready to give up our radical individualism. This cultural upheaval augurs political
and social upheaval, as well as uncertainty about the very basic questions political
culture typically answers for us.
POP CULTURE AND POLITICAL CULTURE
Changes in political culture tend to go unnoticed. It’s not a topic about which the
general public frequently thinks or talks directly. Additionally, such changes tend
to happen over long periods of time and typically as the result of some other process
or event, for example, settling the frontier or bureaucratization.19 However, there
is a place we can look for some indication of such changes. Remember that political
culture shapes how we think about ourselves and each other and the kind of life
we want to lead. As such, pop culture is a good source of insight into political
culture. In television, film, music, art, and fiction we tell stories to ourselves about
ourselves. These stories reflect the basic assumptions and values of their time. By
focusing on certain tropes, such as what counts as a good or worthwhile person,
19Carr (2007), 218-219.
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what kind of life is portrayed as desirable, and how the characters interact with
each other and various institutions we can come to some tentative conclusions
about the political culture of the time.
Carr engages in such pop culture analysis to trace the development of the
American obsession with the radical individual and its eventual conflict with the
bureau. He takes us back to the frontier and reintroduces us to such characters
as Kit Carsen and Davy Crockett. These were real individuals, helping to tame
the frontier away from society and the force of law with nothing but their wits
and their guns standing between them and death. Romanticized stories of their
adventures incited Americans’ radical individualism.20
As Carr shows, the hero of the Old West did not ride into the sunset when
the frontier was conquered. The same character re-appears time and again. The
unattached, self-determining, rude, lawless—or as Carr prefers “ungovernable”—
master of events continues to fascinate us. Carr cites such characters as Rick
Blaine, Sam Spade, and Randall Patrick McMurphy.21 But the story changes with
McMurphy. In One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, the bureau arises in the form of
the ward and Big Nurse. The reader and the chronics cheer for McMurphy, but in
the end McMurphy is “cured” by the bureau via lobotomy.22
There’s a wrenching tragedy reflected in this pop culture analysis. Ameri-
cans continue to celebrate the radical individual. We continue to hold up characters
like Davy Crockett and Rick Blaine as exemplars of what a good and worthwhile
individual is. And yet, the America in which we find ourselves is not a place in
which such characters are appropriate. Our increasingly bureaucratized society
20Carr (2007), 214-216.
21Carr (2007), 211, 214, 217.
22Carr (2007), 215-218.
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has no room for such ungovernable individuals as McMurphy’s fate at the hands of
Big Nurse illustrates. Rather than the Old West, we find ourselves in the cubicle-
filled world of Dilbert.23 Yet, we continue to tell ourselves stories of these mythic
individuals.
Carr’s pop culture analysis indicates that the conflict between our political
culture and the bureau is building. Rather than coming to terms with the bureau,
the suggestion is that Americans continue to cling tightly to their radical individu-
alism. As was discussed in the previous section, there is no stopping the increasing
centralization and bureaucratization of our society. The bureau will continue to
rise. If Americans continue to cling to the myth of radical individualism, their
political culture will increasingly be unable to make sense of the world in which
they find themselves. Expecting a life of the likes of Davy Crockett or Rick Blaine,
yet finding themselves in the world of Dilbert, Americans can expect to go through
life either deluded or disappointed.24
It’s reasonable to ask whether this dissonance between political culture and
the practical realities of life continues to be reflected in the pop culture of today.
After all, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest was published in 1962—over fifty years
ago. The comic strip Dilbert first appeared in 1989—almost twenty-five years ago.
Of course, this comic still appears in newspapers and on o ce doors and cubicle
walls everywhere. Nonetheless, twenty-five years is a considerable amount of time
for pop culture. An examination of some more recent pop culture may be helpful
in drawing conclusions about where we are today on reconciling ourselves to the
bureau.
To this end, two sets of pop culture items will be examined. The first
23Carr (2007), 218.
24Carr (2007), 218.
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consists of three highly popular films from 1999. The films are The Matrix, O ce
Space, and Fight Club. The second consists of three highly popular television
programs that started airing in 2009 and continue to air new episodes at the time
of writing. The shows are Community, Archer, and Parks and Recreation.
All three of the films center on a single main character. In The Matrix, this
character is Thomas Anderson who later comes to be known as “Neo.” In O ce
Space we have Peter Gibbons. In Fight Club, the main character is nameless, but
toward the end of the film we learn that his partner in crime, Tyler Durden, is
his alter ego. Each of these characters is a white-collar worker of some sort. Both
Neo and Peter work as computer programmers while Tyler assesses liability for
manufacturing flaws for a car company.
The plot of each of these films is driven by some sort of rebellion against
the bureau and its demands. Perhaps the most playful of the bunch is O ce
Space. Peter hates his job. He hates the people he works with and his boss’s
drive-by, passive aggressive, wearying management style has become a cultural
meme. As a result of a hypno therapy mis-hap, Peter becomes highly relaxed
and through the rest of the film we see him slowly dismantle his white-collar life-
style. He stops going into work regularly. When he does go into the o ce it’s to
deconstruct his cubicle, gut fish, or steal the perpetually malfunctioning printer
which he and his friends destroy in one of the more cathartic scenes of the film.
When his friends are down-sized in a restructuring, they upload a virus to the
o ce computer system to steal easily over-looked fractions of pennies as revenge.
A coding error, however, means the stolen amount is much larger than expected.
Before Peter can return the funds, a disgruntled co-worker sets fire to the building,
destroying any evidence of the theft. The film ends with a shot of a smiling Peter,
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now working in construction, declining his friends’ o er to get him a job at their
new o ce.
Fight Club is a darker film than O ce Space. The film opens with the main
character flying from one city to another on business, unable to sleep. On one of
these flights the main character meets Tyler Durden. Returning home after yet
another business trip the main character finds his apartment has been bombed out.
He calls Tyler Durden. They agree the main character should stay at Tyler’s place
and then Tyler asks the main character to hit him as hard as he can. The main
character also hates his boss’s passive aggressive management style. Having been
called into his boss’s o ce to discuss his behavior, the main character beats himself
up and blackmails his boss into keeping him on the payroll. Meanwhile, Tyler has
been establishing underground fight clubs in cities all over the country and creates
an organization called “Project Mayhem,” which engages in anti-corporate acts of
sabotage. Towards the end of the film the main character discovers Tyler’s plot to
bomb the o ce buildings of every bank in the area in order to “erase the debt. . . go
back to zero.” In his failed attempt to thwart the plan, the main character discovers
that Tyler Durden is his alter ego. The film ends with Tyler on a rooftop, watching
as a dozen o ce buildings collapse.
The Matrix is a science fiction take on the same themes as O ce Space and
Fight Club. Thomas Anderson is a computer programmer who spends his nights
hacking. In the course of hacking he comes across references to the Matrix. He is
contacted by a man named Morpheus who tells him that intelligent machines have
enslaved the human race to use as a source of bioelectricity. The Matrix, Morpheus
explains, is a simulation of the world as it was in 1999 that the machines use to keep
the humans under control. Morpheus and his crew unplug Thomas Anderson, now
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known as “Neo,” from the Matrix and train him to “free his mind” and manipulate
the rules of the Matrix. We learn that Morpheus believes Neo is “The One,” a
prophesied individual with the ability to control the Matrix, defeat the machines’
agents, and free humankind from their enslavement. In an encounter with an agent,
Neo discovers his ability to control the Matrix and the film closes with him telling
the machines that he will show humankind “a world where anything is possible.”
These films indicate that circa the new millennium Americans still had not
come to terms with the bureau. Each film shows an individual rebelling against
the bureau, whether in the form of an o ce, the corporate world, or even the
entire modern world. Moreover, perhaps with the exception of Tyler Durden,
these characters are not portrayed as maladjusted, insane, or troublemakers. The
bureaus are at fault. It is accepted in O ce Space that corporate life is terrible and
it is only because of the hypno therapy mis-hap that Peter has the wherewithal to
walk away and not bother about the consequences. In the Matrix, the machines
are literally sucking the life out of humankind and the Matrix is enabling them to
do it. It is only because Neo discovers his ability to control the Matrix that he finds
the courage to take on the machines and their agents and save humankind. The
bureau is portrayed as a force that needs to be resisted and, if possible, destroyed.
While Americans remained hostile to the bureau circa the millennium, a
look at these main characters shows that Americans may have begun to shake
free of the radical individual. With the exception of Neo, none of these characters
is particularly impressive. Peter doesn’t have anything in particular he’d rather
do than his programming job. In fact, he just wants to do nothing in particular.
Similarly, the main character in Fight Club isn’t anything to get excited about.
He’s a shallow chested, round shouldered man who spends his days terrorizing his
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boss and his nights fist-fighting other men in the city who have lost touch with
their manhood. These characters just aren’t extraordinary. What’s important
about them, though, is their ungovernability. Peter doesn’t come into work and
doesn’t care when his boss confronts him about it. Tyler uses his insanity to scare
his boss into leaving him alone. Neo can change the Matrix and is unable to be
subdued by the machines’ agents. These characters are ungovernable, if not very
impressive, and we cheer them on because of it.
The television shows under consideration tend to focus less on a single
character, but retain major characters. The show Archer is set in a spy agency
in New York and follows a group of several secret agents, some support sta , and
Sterling and Malory Archer, “the world’s most dangerous spy” and his mother and
spymaster, respectively. Community follows a motley study group at a second-rate
community college called Greendale. Parks and Recreation follows the members
of the parks department of the city government of Pawnee, a fictional town in
Indiana.
Sterling Archer is the major character of the show Archer. Sterling is a
self-centered, womanizing, vain, and likely alcoholic thirty-something man with an
unhealthy relationship with his mother. Despite his moniker “the world’s most
dangerous spy,” Sterling’s performance in the field is frequently compromised by
his inability to work with others. In one recurring plot device, Sterling gives away
the position of himself and his partner/ex-lover because he’s too busy fighting with
her or accusing her of still being in love with him. Yet Sterling always manages
to pull it o  somehow. In one episode Sterling crashes the seaplane belonging to
the man sent to find him after a three month disappearance. In the life boat,
Sterling eats all the emergency rations and uses the flare gun to flag down a pirate
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ship that takes them captive. Nonetheless, by the end of the episode, Sterling has
been made the pirate king. On the whole, there isn’t much about Sterling that is
likable. He has his charming moments, but they’re fleeting. Still, it’s hard not to
like him.
It’s less obvious that the show Community has a single major character.
However, this examination will focus on Je  Winger for purposes of analytic con-
tinuity. Je  Winger is a thirty-something attorney who is attending classes at
Greendale because he was disbarred when it was discovered his bachelor’s degree
is fake. Je  is a self-centered womanizer and very vain. In one episode he gets
kicked out of his PE class for refusing to change into his gym shorts because he
doesn’t “look cool in shorts.” In another episode, Je  encounters another attractive
male who out-performs him in the pottery class Je  is taking for an easy A. Je 
cannot cope with someone else being better than him and he has a breakdown.
Though the study group regularly criticizes Je  for being so self-centered and vain,
they tend to look to him for guidance. In one episode, another character named
Annie tells Je  that he’s “kind of like the dad of the group” and Je  regularly
uses his lawyerly oratorical and manipulation skills to resolve conflicts. Despite
his negative character traits and initial emotional distance, Je  comes to view the
group as a sort of family. It’s only when Je  embraces his role within the group
that he becomes likable.
Leslie Knope is the major character of the show Parks and Recreation.
Leslie is the Deputy Director of the parks and recreation department. She is cheery
and ambitious. Her role models include Hillary Clinton, Madeleine Albright, and
Condoleezza Rice. One day Leslie hopes to be City Manager, but ultimately she
would like to be President of the United States. Leslie’s work is her identity. The
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walls of her o ce are lined with color-coded binders full of ideas she’s had for the
department. We learn through the course of the show that she doesn’t seem ever to
have had a successful romantic relationship. Nor does she seem to do any activities
or have any friends that aren’t work-related. In one episode, she hosts a dinner
party in order to impress a potential love interest. We discover that Leslie can’t
cook a meal and hasn’t unpacked her belongings despite the fact that she’s lived in
this house for years. Leslie hires the community class teachers, whose classes have
recently been cut due to a budget crisis, to cook, clean, and entertain. Leslie is a
bureaucrat, but we love her because she’s smart, funny, and completely sincere in
her enthusiasm for her work at the parks department.
There is a very di erent attitude toward the bureau on display in these
television shows from what we saw in the films from 1999. There are no strong
negative feelings towards the bureau in these shows. There are occasional labor-
management conflicts in Archer, but the explanation is that Malory is being unrea-
sonable. The same benign attitude toward the bureau is on display in Community.
This show is set in a quintessential bureau—a school—yet the interactions we
see between the study group and people in positions of authority are frequently
friendly, though perhaps a little absurd. The professors tend to be unhinged and
the dean, who has adopted the members of the study group as his favorites, period-
ically shows up in drag to give them news and hit on Je . In Parks and Recreation,
the bureau is literally the characters’ natural habitat. They are bureaucrats. Yet,
here too we have an absurd portrayal of the bureau embodied by Leslie’s boss—the
bureaucrat who hates big government. In these shows, the bureau is portrayed as
the harmless and humanized, though often absurd, background of the characters’
lives.
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There is also a very di erent and noticeable shift in attitude toward the
radical individual in these shows. Of the major characters examined, Sterling
Archer is the closest to the ungovernable radical individual, but it’s evident the
audience is supposed to recognize Sterling as an unlikable person. The same is
true of Je  Winger. He only becomes likable when he recognizes that he values
the study group and accepts the responsibilities and expectations that imposes on
him. Leslie Knope is by far the most likable of these characters, but she is also the
furthest from the radical individual type. She is literally a bureaucrat. Further,
none of these characters is truly ungovernable. Sterling may get out of hand on
occasion, but his mother and co-workers keep him in line. Je  realizes that he isn’t
special and his life is better with the study group. Each of these characters is fully
integrated into the social groups of which they are part, often consciously so.
Comparison of the films from 1999 and the television shows from 2009 dis-
plays a significant cultural shift regarding the bureau and the radical individual.
Carr’s pop culture analysis signals growing dissonance between our political cul-
ture and the practical realities of life in the America of today. He warns that
the stories we tell ourselves lead us to expect a life like Davy Crockett’s or Rick
Blaine’s, but given the bureaucratic phenomenon, we find ourselves in the world of
Dilbert. Indeed, this analysis bears out in 1999. O ce Space, Fight Club, and the
Matrix are stories of ungovernable individuals rebelling against and overthrowing
the bureau. Carr warns that if we can’t resolve this dissonance between our polit-
ical culture and practical reality, Americans will go through life either deluded or
disappointed.
However, when we turn to the television shows from 2009 we see a very
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di erent attitude toward the bureau and the individual. In Archer and Com-
munity, the major characters resembling the radical individual type are shamed
and censored into getting along with others. Insofar as these characters resemble
the ungovernable individual, they are portrayed as unlikable. In contrast, Leslie
Knope is the perfect bureaucrat and she is exceedingly likable. Additionally, while
each of these shows are set in a bureau, whether it be a spy agency, a community
college, or a city government, the bureau is not seen as a threat. Moreover, the
bureaucrats in these shows are portrayed as harmless, though often absurd, human
beings. The bureau of 2009 has been defanged.
This is not to suggest that we have conclusively decided against radical
individualism and in favor of the bureau. A fair amount of ambivalence is evident.
Though Sterling and Je  are portrayed as unlikable, we can’t help but be drawn
to them. This ambivalence is reflected in the other characters’ attitudes towards
them. Sterling’s ex-lover repeatedly calls hims an “asshole” and yet it’s clear she’s
still attracted to him. The other members of the study group may criticize Je ’s
self-centeredness, vanity, and emotional distance, but their criticism often seems
motivated by hurt feelings over Je ’s pronouncements that he doesn’t need them.
This ambivalence is also evident in the continued appeal of movies such as
the 2008 Iron Man, which has since become a franchise. Iron Man, or Tony Stark, is
the quintessential ungovernable radical individual. It’s interesting to note, though,
that Tony Stark is independently wealthy, a genius, and battery-powered. While
the success of the Iron Man franchise indicates that the radical individual still
speaks to us, his highly unique circumstances seem a tacit nod to the unreality of
this individual.
An update of the pop culture analysis suggests that we are making some
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progress on reconciling our political culture with the bureau. We see less vilifica-
tion of the bureau and more impatience with the ungovernable individual. We’ve
taken steps toward removing the dissonance between our political culture and the
practical reality of life in America today. But ambivalence remains. This ambiva-
lence is reflected in our pop culture and, indeed, in the 2012 presidential election.
Both President Obama’s and Governor Romney’s visions of America continue to
speak to us.
CULTURE CRISIS
The foregoing pop culture analysis suggests our political culture has been evolving.
We have been shaking ourselves free of our radical individualism and adopting the
bureau as a necessary and even appealing feature of our lives. Davy Crockett and
Randall Patrick McMurphy were until recently held up as heroes worthy of admi-
ration and imitation. Today characters sharing their ungovernability are censored
and portrayed as anti-heroes. The radical individual still fascinates us, but we are
beginning to realize that the life of the radical individual will not be our life.
The shift between the films of 1999 and the films of 2009 show that we
have begun to reevaluate our view of the bureau. Whereas the good life of the
radical individual was incompatible with the bureau, we have begun to developed a
revised picture of the good life. We have begun the process of adapting our picture
of the good life to include the bureau. This is evident in the kinds of life decisions
made by the members of Generation Y. Generation Y made life decisions with
the demands of the bureau in mind. They went to college to obtain degrees and
some knowledge that a bureau might find valuable. Many of them have worked
unpaid or underpaid internships to gain experience in some industry. In order to
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fund these years of professional development, they took out massive school loans
rationalizing this debt as an investment in their future.
The fundamental idea underlying these actions was the promise of the bu-
reau. The members of Generation Y were taught that if they received a degree
from a decent college or university and obtained some relevant work experience,
they would find a career in a bureau. They were taught that if they played by the
rules, kept their heads down, and did their work that they could expect to earn
a living wage. Their lives might not be grand or glamorous, but they would be
comfortable lives. They could expect to have evenings, weekends, the occasional
vacation, and some disposable income to live a comfortable, if modest, life.
The Recession has indelibly and irreversibly changed the lives of this gen-
eration of people. Young adults graduating from college following the 2008 Re-
cession faced the worst job market in recent history. Burdened with thousands
of dollars of loan debt, these recent graduates found themselves faced with a job
market in which mid-salary jobs have been replaced with low-salary jobs. Unable
to both support themselves and repay their student loans, many of these young
adults moved back in with their parents, exchanging the name “Generation Y” for
“the Boomerang Generation.” Faced with uncertain financial futures, these young
adults find themselves unable to attain the modest, but comfortable lives they’ve
been told to expect. They are putting o  buying houses, getting married, having
children, and even simply buying a car.
The Recession has made our revised picture of the good life unattainable.
This revised picture is a casualty of the 2008 Recession and its fall-out. The story
the members of Generation Y told themselves about how their lives would go is
no longer helpful in explaining their experience or guiding their life choices. This
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picture leads them to desire a kind of life that is no longer available. To continue
to cling to it can only result in confusion and disappointment.
What this generation of Americans is facing is an instance of culture crisis.
By “culture crisis” I mean a historical moment in which our culture comes apart
from the practical realities of our lives.25 In moments of culture crisis, our culture
leads us to expect a world drastically di erent from the one in which we find
ourselves. In this case, the picture of the good life embedded in our political
culture no longer helps us make sense of our lives. Generation Y is burdened with
a pre-Recession picture of the good life in a post-Recession world.
The phenomenon of culture crisis is similar to cultural myth, such as the
myth of the radical individual. These myths lead us to expect a world di erent
from the world in which we find ourselves, as is the case in a moment of culture
crisis. An individual in the grip of the myth of the radical individual, as Carr
argues, expects to find himself in the world of Davy Crockett and Kit Carsen.
This myth leads the individual to think he can make his own way, play by his own
rules, and control his own destiny. The tragedy of such myths, as was discussed
above, is that this individual does not live in the world of Davy Crockett and Kit
Carsen, but in the world of Dilbert and Leslie Knope.
25Readers familiar with Wittgenstein’s thought may take issue with the distinction I am draw-
ing here between “culture” and “practical reality” or “the world.” After all, as we will see in
the next chapter, Wittgenstein argues that we make the world through our language and cul-
ture. How, then, these readers will ask, could these things come apart? My response is two-fold.
Firstly, I am only introducing the problem here. I will argue in the next chapter that we need a
Wittgensteinian framework to make sense of the problem. To employ a Wittgensteinian frame-
work here would be fairly controversial and question-begging. Indeed, one of the questions of
this thesis is how we even make sense of the phenomenon of culture crisis. Secondly, I think it
is a mistake to think of culture as a self-consistent whole. I think it’s fairly likely that our goals,
values, and picture of the good life is always out of sync, to some degree, with technology and
how we organize ourselves as a society. For the time being, I am employing this distinction in
order to avoid begging the question. Later on I’ll employ it for analytic clarity, though, of course,
the Wittgensteinians won’t like it.
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The phenomenon of culture crisis is similar to cultural myth, but it is also
importantly di erent. In a moment of culture crisis, the expectation to find our-
selves in a particular world is a reasonable expectation. The members of Gen-
eration Y expected to find themselves in the world of Dilbert and Leslie Knope.
They expected to live the kind of life millions of people had been living until very
recently. Whereas the life of the radical individual became a practical impossibility
with the settlement of the frontier, the life of Dilbert and Leslie Knope became an
impossibility almost over night a few years ago. The source of culture crisis is not
a lack of sober assessment of the world in which one lives. Rather, the source of
culture crisis is a sudden and drastic change in the world in which one lives.
The members of Generation Y need a picture of the good life that can help
them navigate life in a post-Recession world. Given that culture is a collective
creation, this problem ultimately requires a collective solution. However, collective
solutions take time and the individual has a life to live right now. Culture crisis
can threaten to doom the individual to an unsatisfied and unfulfilled life simply
because she was given a picture that doesn’t match the world in which she finds
herself. Such an individual is the topic of this thesis. The question that will be
considered is: Is the individual caught in a moment of culture crisis fated to live
an unfulfilled life or is there anything the individual can do to resolve the problem
of culture crisis in her own case?
The liberal might find this question to be a non-starter. The liberal in-
dividual is, after-all, in control of her own destiny. This explanation, however,
cannot account for the tenacity of the problem of culture crisis and is dismissive
of culture itself. On the other hand, one might be inclined to say that as culture
crisis is a community-wide problem, it needs a community-wide resolution. That
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seems right. Yet, the individual has a life to lead right now and she can’t wait for
everyone else to figure it out collectively.
The practical consequences of this problem should be clear. Nevertheless,
the following investigation will be concerned with the conceptual underpinnings of
culture crisis. This thesis will focus, in particular, on the philosophical thought
of Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. I will argue in the next chapter that we need a
Wittgensteinian view of language to make sense of the problem of culture crisis.
I will argue in the third chapter that in order to avoid an unfulfilling life our
individual needs to be something like a Nietzschean individual. The fourth chapter
will argue that we need a Wittgensteinian view of language and culture to make
sense of Nietzsche’s idea of overcoming. The fifth chapter will consider whether
Wittgenstein’s view of language renders the Nietzschean individual a conceptual
impossibility. The sixth chapter will assess the fate of our individual.
This chapter introduced the idea of political culture and traced the devel-
opment of American political culture. Carr’s bureaucratic phenomenon and his
suggestion that it augurs a potentially fundamental change in political culture was
explored. An extension of the analysis to the pop culture of today showed that we
have made some progress in reconciling our political culture with the bureaucratic
phenomenon. It was suggested that the growing recognition of the bureau as a
benign feature of life was accompanied by the development of a revised picture of
the good life in which the bureau was seen as a means to contentment and success.
However, the fall-out of the 2008 Recession has rendered this developing picture
of the good life unattainable and a source of disappointment.
Something is happening in America today. We can see it in the events
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that we read about in our newspapers and in the shows we watch during prime
time. This culture crisis potentially means a whole generation of Americans are
fated to live unsatisfying and unfulfilled lives. This thesis is concerned with these
individuals. It asks whether these individuals are fated to pretend that the picture
of the good life embedded in their pre-Recession political culture is adequate to
the demands of their lives or whether they can free themselves from this picture
and potentially find happiness.
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A WITTGENSTEINIAN WORLD
Wittgenstein’s thought is not typically regarded as concerned with the human
condition. Despite this tendency, there are numerous comments in his notebooks
on such topics as religion, war, progress, and culture. These tend to be dismissed
as casual observations. Wittgenstein is usually read as strictly concerned with
the nature of language, mathematics, psychology, and philosophical method. Such
topics are, it is assumed, obviously separate from the political, social, or cultural.
Béla Szabados attributes this to the tendency in analytic philosophy to regard one’s
biographical and historical context as irrelevant to one’s philosophical thought.26
Despite this tendency in Wittgenstein interpretation, several philosophers
and theorists have seen a connection between Wittgenstein’s thought and the hu-
man condition. This thesis represents another example. The aim of this chapter is
to argue that we need something like a Wittgensteinian view of language in order
to account for the phenomenon of culture crisis. First it will introduce the reader
to the political and cultural side of Wittgenstein interpretation. Then it will ar-
gue that culture crisis is ultimately linguistic in nature because it is a conceptual
failure. Several criteria will be enumerated that a view of language must meet if
it is to account for culture crisis. It will be shown that a Wittgensteinian view of
language can meet these criteria whereas a Russellian view cannot.
26Szabados (2010), 226. A similar but more cautious ground for ignoring these comments is to
observe that Wittgenstein never elaborated a philosophy of the political or of culture. As such,
anything we might say on the topic can only be speculation because we have no way of knowing
what that was. This stance was articulated to me by Peter Hacker.
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CULTURE AND POLITICS IN WITTGENSTEIN
Despite the tendency in Wittgenstein interpretation to dismiss his comments on
the political, social, or cultural, several philosophers and theorists have seen a
connection between his thought and the human condition. First and foremost was
Wittgenstein himself. Indeed, in an early draft of the foreward for Philosophical
Occasions, Wittgenstein wrote:
This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in
which it is written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current
of European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization
makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our
time, in its fascism and socialism, and it is alien and uncongenial to
the author.27
Further on in the draft he indicates that he thinks European and American civ-
ilization are marked by “the disappearance of a culture.”28 Such sentiments are
reprised in the preface to Philosophical Investigations in which he expresses doubt
that the book will be illuminating to its readers “in its poverty and in the darkness
of this time.”29 Thus, as von Wright has observed, though Wittgenstein did not
give a philosophy of the political or of culture he “thought that the problems with
which he was struggling were somehow connected with ‘the way people live’, that
is, with features of our culture or civilization. . . ”30
Some philosophers and theorists have drawn theoretical implications from
Wittgenstein’s view of language. Wittgenstein’s idea that language is bound up
with what he called “forms of life” has led several social scientists to insist on
27Wittgenstein (1977), 6e.
28Wittgenstein (1977), 6e.
29Wittgenstein (1967), x.
30von Wright (1998), 110.
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greater attention to language. Hanna Pitkin, for instance, uses Wittgenstein’s
work to argue that in order to study action e ectively, we first need to study the
grammar of the word “action” to understand its nature.31 Pitkin makes a similar
argument about our political concepts like “justice.”32
Hans Sluga extends this idea to political engagement by suggesting that ac-
tive political engagement requires a working knowledge of our political concepts.33
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance concepts, Sluga argues, suggests that
our political concepts may have a multifaceted nature that di ers from what we’ve
assumed in the past.34
In a di erent vein, Peter Winch takes Wittgenstein’s view of language to
collapse the distinction between action and language.35 In order to explain action,
we must do what we do when we explain language: identify the rule that gives
it meaning.36 According to this view, the meaning of an individual’s action is
determined by the social rules or norms in which she partakes. David Bloor devel-
ops a similar reading to serve as the theoretical underpinnings of his sociological
studies.37
Other interpreters have attempted to derive a specific political stance from
Wittgenstein’s views on language. János Nyíri, for example, argues that we should
consider Wittgenstein as a conservative thinker. The core of Nyíri’s argument is
that because forms of life are the “given” in Wittgenstein’s view, there is no per-
spective or ground from which to criticize them.38 David Bloor further develops
31Pitkin (1972), 140-168, 241-262.
32Pitkin (1972), 182-191.
33Sluga (2011), 137.
34Sluga (2011), 138.
35Winch (1973), 121-128.
36Winch (1973), 50-63.
37Bloor (1983), Bloor (1997).
38Nyíri (1998), 58-59.
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this conservative reading by arguing that if Edmund Burke had considered ques-
tions on the same level of abstraction as Wittgenstein, he would have come up
with very similar answers.39
Others have found the conservative reading to rest upon a limited or mis-
taken understanding of Wittgenstein’s view. David Cerbone, for instance, argues
that conservative readings take concepts and forms of life to be more separable
than Wittgenstein intended.40 Pitkin argues that some of our concepts, like “jus-
tice,” contain standards of judgment which allow us to critique current practices
or institutions.41
More recently, Christopher Robinson has suggested that Wittgenstein was
simply dissatisfied with scientism and the rise of the bureaucracy rather than
with modernity as a whole.42 On Robinson’s account, Wittgenstein gave his view
of language as a way of reversing the damage done to trust by war, genocide,
and terrorism, as well as providing a means of resisting the bureaucratization of
society.43
The work of these theorists and philosophers is invaluable. However, Wittgen-
stein’s comments regarding his own work suggest that he sees a much more intimate
connection between his view of language and the human condition. There is ev-
idence of this as early as the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In a letter to his
publisher, Wittgenstein insisted that “the point of the book [the Tracatus] was
ethical.”44
39Bloor (2004), 113.
40Cerbone (2003), Cf. Crary (2000).
41Pitkin (1972), 182-217.
42Robinson (2009), 89-90.
43Robinson (2009), 61, 98. Robinson’s argument is fairly opaque and relies heavily on a
metaphor of walking as well as speculation on how Wittgenstein must have felt during the war.
44Quoted in Monk (1990), 178.
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Despite Wittgenstein’s insistence, interpreters have had di culty making
sense of this remark. For instance, unable to understand Wittgenstein’s claim that
the ethical is unsayable, Daniel McManus invokes the idea of the inner voice of God
or conscience to explain what Wittgenstein must mean.45 Cora Diamond suggests
that we read these ethical propositions in the same way as metaphysical non-sense
propositions: imaginatively, using our imagination to understand what the non-
sense propositions are trying to tell us.46 In the case of metaphysical non-sense
propositions, this imaginative engagement is thought to be therapeutic, ridding
us of the temptation to such propositions.47 Assuming this is a good reading
of the Tractatus,48 it still does not help us understand its ethical dimension as
Diamond insists the ethical propositions are not meant to be therapeutic in the
same way. Peter Hacker takes an alternate approach and simply dismisses the
ethical comments as tacked on and poorly integrated into the rest of the work.49
Fortunately, we needn’t speculate. Wittgenstein elaborated on the ethical
aspect of the Tractatus eight years after its publication in his “A Lecture on Ethics.”
He uses the term “ethics” broadly to mean “the enquiry into what is valuable. . . the
meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of
living.”50 He clarifies that he is interested only in instrinsic or absolute values, as
opposed to relative or trivial values. By relative values, he means values relative
to a standard or purpose. Thus, if I say “This is a good knife” the goodness here
is relative to the standard of chopping or slicing e ciently. That is, it’s a good
45McManus (2006), 175-176, 181-182.
46Diamond (2000), 156-158.
47Diamond (2000), 160.
48There is reason to think it’s not. Cf. Hacker (2003).
49From conversation. Hacker speculates that Wittgenstein’s concern with the ethical here is a
manifestation of post-traumatic stress disorder from serving in the war.
50Wittgenstein (1965), 5.
34
knife because of the fact that it is sharp. The di erence between relative and
absolute values, he claims, is that relative values are statements of fact whereas
“no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value.”51 No
proposition can imply a judgment of absolute value because propositions only
assert facts. The whole set of true propositions, he says, is just the whole of
natural science and there are no propositions of value among them.52 This is the
view of language he set out in the Tractatus.53 As absolute value is not part of the
natural world, he refers to it as the “supernatural.”54
Putative ethical propositions are non-sense, then, because they do not assert
facts. Insofar as our ethical propositions do have sense, Wittgenstein argues, they
do not have the sense we want. They are essentially non-sense.55 This is consistent
with his claim in the Tractatus that “ethics cannot be put into words.”56 However,
the fact that we cannot talk about ethics does not mean that we should neglect it.
Indeed, Wittgenstein closes the lecture by emphasizing the importance of ethics.
Ethics, he says, “so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the
ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no
science. . . But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally
cannot help respecting deeply. . . ”57 Though we may not be able to speak of it
sensibly, ethics is a significant concern.
In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein says of his work:
I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the
51Wittgenstein (1965), 6.
52Wittgenstein (1965), 6-7.
53Cf. Wittgenstein (1961), 3.203, 4.022, 4.1, 4.5, 6.42.
54Wittgenstein (1961), 6.41.
55Wittgenstein (1965), 11.
56Wittgenstein (1961), 6.421.
57Wittgenstein (1965), 12.
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final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief,
then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that
it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.58
The problems to which he is referring are the problems of clarifying the relation-
ship between language and the world. Wittgenstein claims he has solved these
problems. But this view assumes language is essentially an instrument of science.
Wittgenstein’s claim that he has shown how little is achieved when we have solved
these problems suggests that science cannot discover or explain the meaning of life
for us. We must address these most important questions in some other way. This is
the sentiment he expresses at the end of the Tractatus when he says, “We feel that
even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life
remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this
itself is the answer.”59 We have to look for what makes life valuable somewhere
else and in some other way.60
The aim of exploring the ethical in Wittgenstein’s early thought was to get
some sense as to what Wittgenstein saw as the connection between language and
the human condition. The suggestion is that it follows from Wittgenstein’s early
view of language that value and the meaning of life are outside the jurisdiction
of science. Wittgenstein later gives up this view of language, but this does not
mean he gave up interest in what makes life valuable. Indeed, there is likely a
connection here with the comments Wittgenstein made a year later regarding the
disappearance of culture in his draft foreward for the Philosophical Occasions and
his darkness comment in the preface for Philosophical Investigations. For now,
however, let’s turn to the relationship between culture crisis and language.
58Wittgenstein (1961), 4.
59Wittgenstein (1961), 6.52.
60Cf. Sluga (2011), 41-55, Pears (1985), 57, 88, Pitkin (1972), 30.
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CULTURE CRISIS AND LANGUAGE
The previous section considered the connection Wittgenstein and others have seen
between his work and the human condition. This section will consider the relation-
ship between culture crisis and language. As we saw in the first chapter, “political
culture” refers to the shared norms and beliefs that make a group of people into
a political unit. It consists of the basic assumptions and values that we employ in
our everyday lives.
In times of culture crisis some aspect of our culture leads us to expect
a world drastically di erent from the one we find ourselves in. In the case of
Generation Y the idea of the good life embedded in the political culture is no
longer attainable. This idea leads the individual members of Generation Y to
expect their lives to go a certain way. However, this pre-Recession idea of the
good life can only be a source of frustration and dissatisfaction in a post-Recession
world.
We can make sense of the phenomenon of culture crisis as a failure of con-
cepts. Concepts, like the basic assumptions and values of political culture, tell us
how things are and how we should proceed. Liberal political culture, for instance,
tells us that individuals are capable of setting their own goals and determining the
course of their own lives and that they should be treated that way. In terms of
concepts, what this means is that in liberal political culture, the concept “person”
means an individual capable of setting her own goals and determining the course of
her own life. It is also part of the concept “person” that such an individual should
be treated as an individual capable of setting their own goals and determining the
course of their own life. We can, then, think of political culture as a shared set of
interrelated concepts. On this conceptual understanding of political culture, then,
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culture crisis occurs when our concepts no longer fit the world in which we find
ourselves.
The philosophy of language is the study of the nature of concepts, words,
propositions, thought, and the relationships between them. Since culture crisis
is a conceptual failure, an adequate view of language should be able to account
for this phenomenon. Due to the complex nature of culture crisis, it may be
helpful to enumerate criteria that a view of language must fulfill if it is to account
for culture crisis. These criteria simply capture aspects of political culture and
culture crisis as described in the first chapter. They are are: 1) account for the
fact that concepts can have both normative and descriptive aspects; 2) account for
the fact that concepts change; 3) account for the dissonance between our concepts
and the world; 4) account for the collective nature of culture crisis; and 5) account
for the tenacity of the problem of culture crisis. To show that these criteria do
exclude at least some views we will consider whether Bertrand Russell’s view of
language can meet them.61
The initial thought underlying Russell’s view of language is highly intuitive.
The purpose of language, he assumes, is to describe the world. This is a simple
beginning. On Russell’s view, a proposition is a complex of words. These words
are like names that stand for various kinds of objects. They might stand for a
person, an object, a relation, or a property. A proposition is true so long as the
relation asserted to hold among the constituents of the proposition obtains in the
world. Thus, the proposition “The book is blue” is true because the book I’m
61Russell’s view of language is similar in substance and motivation to views forwarded by other
thinkers, such as Plato and Kant. The focus on Russell is meant to simplify the discussion for
the reader as well as to remain true to Wittgenstein’s biography. The reader should keep in
mind, however, that Russell’s view is examined as an example of a class of views on the nature
of language.
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referring to stands in the predication relation to the color blue. So far this seems
unproblematic.
Russell’s view gets more complicated from here. He philosophized in the
hey-day of sense-data. The idea behind sense-data is that the knowledge I have of
the world depends upon my experience of the world through my sense perceptors.
Strictly speaking, then, I don’t see a blue book. Rather, I see a rectangular-shaped
blue patch in my visual field. This sense-data idea leads Russell to conclude that
what I really know when I assert the true proposition “The book is blue” is not
directly anything about the book, but rather something about my sense-data.
However, Russell wasn’t a sceptic about the external world. Indeed, he
firmly believed that there are physical objects. He just thought we didn’t have
any direct knowledge about them. In his terminology, we don’t have knowledge
of physical objects by acquaintance, as we do our sense-data.62 We only know
physical objects by description.63 That is, I know that there is an object that
must satisfy the description “The object causing a rectangular-shaped blue patch
in my visual field right now.” In fact, Russell thinks that most words are really
shorthand for such sense-data descriptions.64 Thus, when I assert the seemingly
simple and unproblematic sentence “The book is blue” what I am actually asserting
is a very long proposition about sense-data. What makes it true is that there is
such an object (a book) and it actually does stand in the predication relation to
the color blue.
It’s here that Russell’s view of language gets really interesting. Despite the
62Russell (1910-1911), 109-112. For the sake of completeness, Russell also believed that we
have knowledge of ourselves, concepts (as opposed to particulars), and universal relations, but
this isn’t directly relevant to the discussion here.
63Russell (1910-1911), 112-113.
64Russell (1910-1911), 114.
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fact that we think we’re talking about physical objects and we intend to make
assertions about physical objects, we really only ever manage to make assertions
about sense-data.65 Nonetheless, Russell maintains that when I say “The book is
blue” and when you say “The book is blue,” we’re both talking about the same blue
book.66 That blue book, after all, is what makes our respective assertions true.
But, because the sense-data I have are di erent from the sense-data you have,
the propositions we assert are di erent. The proposition in my mouth consists of
di erent descriptions than the proposition in your mouth.67 Despite this di erence,
Russell maintains that what matters for communication is just that the same
objects answer to our di erent descriptions.68
Though Russell’s view of language started from a highly intuitive idea, the
resulting account his highly unintuitive. The seemingly simple sentence “The book
is blue,” once subjected to a Russellian analysis is hardly simple at all. Indeed, this
superficial simplicity is only a shorthand for a very long proposition about sense-
data. On Russell’s view we only ever manage to speak and think about physical
objects indirectly. Moreover, while two people may assert the same set of true
propositions, these propositions necessarily have di erent analyses and di erent
meanings for these two people. Russell’s analysis maintains our initial intuition
that language describes the world at the price of a highly unintuitive explanation
of meaning and thought.
It’s not clear that Russell’s view of language can even begin to account
for culture crisis. This is so even if we ignore Russell’s thoroughly thin view of
concepts according to which concepts are simply general terms like “triangle,”
65Russell (1910-1911), 116, 117, 127.
66Russell (1910-1911), 116.
67Russell (1910-1911), 114-115.
68Russell (1910-1911), 116.
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“leaf,” and “red.” With regard to criterion 1), Russell’s view of language draws a
strict dividing line between the descriptive and the normative. With regards to
criterion 2), since words are taken to be names or descriptions for people, objects,
relations, or properties and these are constituents of the world, it’s not clear that
there’s any room for these to change. With regards to criterion 3), insofar as we
could make sense of this criterion, it seems as though a Russellian would have to
say that we’d simply gotten things wrong. Language represents the world. If it
doesn’t, it’s because we’ve made a mistake. As for criteria 4) and 5) the only
account that appears available to the Russellian is to claim that we have all made
the same mistake and continue to fail to see our error.
The initial thought underlying Russell’s view of language is intuitive. How-
ever, the resultant view is highly unintuitive and it is unable to clearly account
for any aspect of culture crisis. This in no way constitutes a conclusive argument
against views of language that start from a similar initial thought, but it should
serve to raise suspicion.69 If we accept the conceptual rendering of culture crisis,
then any adequate view of language should be able to account for this phenomenon.
The Russellian view can’t even begin to meet this standard.
WITTGENSTEIN ON LANGUAGE
Wittgenstein, too, was initially impressed by the Russellian view of language. In-
deed, in the Tractatus he o ers a view of language which is largely a refinement of
Russell’s. By the early 1930’s, however, Wittgenstein seriously began to question
the Russellian view of language. Having spent the early part of his philosoph-
ical career in the thrall of such a view, he understood its seemingly irresistible
69Cf. Sluga (2011), 74.
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obviousness. Indeed, similar views on the nature of language continue to enjoy
wide-spread adherence and advocacy today.
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein presents a concerted at-
tack on views like Russell’s. As was seen in the previous section, such views start
with what seem to be obvious and intuitively true insights. The purpose of lan-
guage, Russell thought, was to describe the world via true propositions. This view
takes the description of the world or the production of true propositions to be the
essential function of language. By the time he was working on the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects this view and the argument from intuition on
which it relies. Intuition is neither an argument for a philosophical position nor
an insight into the nature of things.70
Wittgenstein further criticizes the Russellian view, and his own view in the
Tractatus, for imposing requirements upon the nature of language. That is, the
Russellian view assumes that language has a simple, uniform, logically consistent
nature. Wittgenstein argues, however, that the “more narrowly we examine actual
language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it” and this requirement.71
Despite this conflict, Russell and others fail to consider that language does not
have a simple, uniform, logically consistent structure.
Wittgenstein brings out the inadequacy of such a view of language with
an example of a primitive language. This language is used by two builders. The
language consists of the words “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” and “beam.” When one
builder calls out one of these words, the other brings the appropriate kind of stone.
This is an example of a language wherein words are like names, as in Russell’s view,
70Wittgenstein (1967), §254, §299.
71Wittgenstein (1967), §107.
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but it hardly approximates the complexity of our language.72
Views such as Russell’s find their motivation in the conviction that getting
clear on the nature of language will help us solve other philosophical problems.
The assumption is that because the language we use only approximates language
in its pure, formal, logically consistent form, we get confused. Our questions
have answers. The solution will become clear once we clean up our language. In
contrast, Wittgenstein complains in the Philosophical Investigations that this gets
the nature of language wrong. This view assumes that language is transcendent or
supernatural. Instead, Wittgenstein argues that the concept “language” is just like
other mundane concepts: messy, complicated, and an organic human creation.73
Wittgenstein realized that the initial obviousness of views such as Russell’s
was due to the questions we were asking. The suggestion is that the initial intu-
itiveness of a Russellian view of language is the result of asking after the meanings
of words. The temptation is to take a simple and supposedly representative sen-
tence such as “The book is blue” and look for a referent for each of the words.74
This tends to lead to views like Russell’s.
Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations by suggesting that we
change the questions we ask about language. Rather than asking after the mean-
ings of words, Wittgenstein admonishes us to ask how we use words.75 This ques-
tion brings to our attention the various, if related, ways in which we use a particular
word and the multitude of things we do with language.76 It also allows us to rec-
ognize the role tone and facial expression play in language.77 The focus on how we
72Wittgenstein (1967), §2, Cf. Wittgenstein (1967), §107, §114.
73Wittgenstein (1967), §97, §108.
74Wittgenstein (1958), 1.
75Wittgenstein (1958), §1, §4, §43, §§73-74, Wittgenstein (1967), §1, §20.
76Wittgenstein (1967), §23, §27, §§65-67, Cf. Wittgenstein (1958), §§17-20, §§137-139, §xi.
77Wittgenstein (1967), §21.
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use words allows us to see the messy, complicated, and organic nature of language.
Wittgenstein introduces the term “language-game” to capture this new un-
derstanding of language. The invocation of the notion of games is meant to em-
phasize that language is an activity in which we engage.78 Giving orders, reporting
an event, forming a hypothesis, making up a story, guessing riddles, asking, curs-
ing, and praying are examples of some activities we can only do by means of
language.79 But Wittgenstein sees the relationship between language and our ac-
tivities as more fundamental than these examples indicate. Language, he insists,
is “part of an activity, or a form of life” where form of life refers to the institutions,
practices or customs of a community.80 Elsewhere Wittgenstein equates language
with a culture.81
Through its concepts, our language both reflects and enables us to engage
in our form of life. For instance, the concept of marriage both reflects that we
are a society that engages in legally and religiously sanctioned unions between two
people and enables us to engage in this practice. Our concepts depend upon our
form of life for their meaning. As our form of life changes, so too do our concepts.82
The language-game understanding of language is also meant to bring to
our attention that language is governed by rules. Games are only games if there
are rules which determine correct gameplay. In the case of language, the rules
governing a word tell us what kind of thing its referent is as well as the ways and
contexts in which we can use the word. Just as the rules which govern correct
gameplay, the rules which determine correct usage of words are conventions. They
78Wittgenstein (1967), §23.
79Wittgenstein (1967), §23.
80Wittgenstein (1967), §23, §199.
81Wittgenstein (1958), 134-135.
82Wittgenstein (1967), §18, §19, §23.
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are conventions we have created and accepted as guiding our moves within the
language-game.
The rules governing the use of a word take certain normal conditions for
granted. For instance, just as the rules of checkers do not tell the players what to
do in case a passing seagull eats half the pieces, the rules governing the meaning of
“measure” do not tell us what to do in case objects start changing size.83 The rules,
then, are indefinite. However, the fact that the meaning of a word is determined
by an indefinite rule does not mean the meaning of the word is indefinite. The
words operate perfectly well within normal conditions.84 We know, generally, how
to use them.85 Language is an activity governed by indefinite rules.86
In addition to the messiness of indefinite rules, Wittgenstein’s language-
game view takes language to be inherently complicated. Whereas Russell believes
that in proper, formalized language words have one definite meaning, Wittgenstein
eschews this stance. Indeed, Wittgenstein further distances himself from a Russel-
lian view by introducing the idea of “family resemblance” concepts. The idea of a
family resemblance concept is that for some concepts there is no common feature
or unifying essence that is shared by all the items to which the concept applies.87
Wittgenstein famously uses the example of games to illustrate this point.
There is no single set of characteristics common to all games. Some involve balls,
some cards, some are played with others and some played only with oneself.88
Many of our concepts, Wittgenstein argues, are unbounded like this. Nonetheless,
there is, he says, a family resemblance among the various things we call games.
83Wittgenstein (1967), §142.
84Wittgenstein (1967), 81-88.
85Wittgenstein (1967), 148-155.
86Cf. Wittgenstein (1977), 78e, Wittgenstein (1958) §25, §43.
87Wittgenstein (1967), §67.
88Wittgenstein (1967), §66.
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Though they may not all have some characteristic in common, the di erent kinds
of games are “related” to each other in various ways.89
Though language is messy and complicated, Wittgenstein is not sceptical
about getting clear on the meanings of our words. We can achieve this by engaging
in investigation of what he refers to as its “grammar.” The grammar of a word
consists of the rules governing its use and the family resemblance relations that
might obtain between di erent uses. By investigating the grammar of a particular
word, we can get clear on the nature of the related concept.90 For instance, in
the appropriate circumstances the sentence “This color is red” is a grammatical
statement which tells us that “red” is a color word and, when accompanied by
an appropriate sample, this statement tells us which color it is. In investigating
the concept “red,” we might come across the phrases “He saw red” and “Her
cheeks flushed red” and note that in some cases red has to do with anger and
embarrassment or, perhaps, arousal.
On Wittgenstein’s language-game view of language, our relationship to lan-
guage is profound. Language is not merely a means of describing the world or
communicating thoughts. Rather, a language, a form of life—a culture—comes
with its own world-picture.91 When we learn language we don’t only learn a bunch
of words, or even how to do certain things with words. Rather, we learn a total
system of concepts and judgments.92 When we learn language we become encul-
turated into a total way of seeing and understanding the world. This can include
everything from empirical judgments to religious beliefs.93 The concepts of our
89Wittgenstein (1967), §65.
90Wittgenstein (1967), §371, §373.
91Wittgenstein (1969), §162, §211.
92Wittgenstein (1969), §105, §140, §141, §144.
93Wittgenstein (1969), §32, §53, §60, §85, §298.
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language tell us how the world is, what kind of thing we are, and what kind of life
is worth living. This world-picture is the implicit background of our activities and
the lives we lead.94 The world is as our world-picture tells us it is.
On a Wittgensteinian view of language, then, language is a system of con-
cepts. We impose an order on the world via our concepts. They constitute our
world-picture and, as such, are closely bound up with our form of life and our
activities. In learning language we are taught to see and understand the world in
a particular way. We accept certain judgments about how the world is and how we
should live and act without question. We are initiated into a particular culture.
We learn to see and act in accordance with the messy, complicated, organic human
creation of language.
Wittgenstein was particularly fascinated with the phenomenon of entangle-
ment. The rules of our language, typically, guide us without trouble. However,
there are times when we become entangled in the rules of our language. Wittgen-
stein notes that this happens, for instance, in mathematics:
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a
game, and that when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we
had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own
rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get
a clear view of).95
In moments of entanglement, we become trapped within our concepts, unable to
see our way out. This, for instance, is what Wittgenstein thinks has happened
with philosophers investigating the nature of language. Philosophers have been
94Wittgenstein (1969), §144, §472, §476.
95Wittgenstein (1967), §125.
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unable to get clear on the nature of language, Wittgenstein suggests, because they
are trapped within their concept of what language is and how it operates.96
Wittgenstein takes the aim of philosophy to be freeing ourselves from such
entanglements. He, admittedly, holds a very conservative view of the nature of
philosophy. Philosophy does not free us from these entanglements by altering our
concepts. Philosophy leaves things as they are.97 However, philosophy’s investi-
gation into the rules of our concepts and the underlying language-game view of
language provides us a means of escape from entanglement. Such investigations
show us that the problem lies in our concepts which are human creations and,
therefore, capable of human re-creation.98
Now that we have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s view of language,
let’s consider whether it can account for culture crisis. Criterion 1) requires an
account for the fact that concepts can have both descriptive and normative aspects.
Wittgenstein’s view can easily meet this criterion. The concepts of our world-
picture both describe how the world is and how we should proceed. Criterion 2)
requires an account of conceptual change. On Wittgenstein’s view because our
concepts are shaped by our form of life, changes in this compel changes in our
concepts. Criterion 3) requires an account of dissonance between our concepts
and the practical realities of our lives. This would occur on Wittgenstein’s view if
conditions strayed beyond the boundaries of normal conditions. In such a sitution,
our concepts lead us to expect one world, but we find ourselves in another. We
are entangled. Wittgenstein’s view meets criterion 4) by the fact that our world-
picture is shared by the other members of our language community.
96Wittgenstein (1967), §§89-108.
97Wittgenstein (1967), §124.
98Wittgenstein (1967), §109, §§114-115, §129, cf. §374, §401.
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The interesting aspect of the Wittgensteinian view of language is its re-
sponse to criterion 5). This criterion requires that a view of language account for
the tenacity of the problem of culture crisis. Wittgenstein’s view meets this crite-
rion by pointing to the mundanity of our world-picture. As Wittgenstein observes
in a 1947 comment, this world-picture “lies in front of everyone’s eyes.”99 This
picture is so fundamental to our every experience, our testing and confirming of
hypotheses, our making judgments, and our activities that often we don’t even
realize it is there to question it. The problem of culture crisis is tenacious because
we often don’t know to look for the problem in the right place.
The problem of culture crisis can be rephrased in Wittgensteinian terms as:
A historical moment when our world-picture ceases to be a good one. In the case
of Generation Y, this problem arises because the picture of the good life they were
given leads them to expect and desire a kind of life that is no longer available.
However, due to the suddenness of the transition to a post-Recession world and
the mundanity of our world-picture, Generation Y continues to operate with a
pre-Recession world-picture. In order to resolve this problem, Generation Y needs
to adopt a world-picture better suited to the post-Recession world. The question
is whether this is a solution available to the individual by herself.
This chapter opened with a consideration of the connection betweenWittgen-
stein’s thought and the human condition. Many philosophers and theorists have
seen a connection, including Wittgenstein himself. An examination of the ethical
in the Tractatus suggested that it follows from Wittgenstein’s early view of lan-
guage that science cannot tell us what makes life valuable. Wittgenstein tells us
99Wittgenstein (1977), 63, Cf. Wittgenstein (1977), 39.
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to look elsewhere for meaning. This advice rests on the strict division between
fact and value assumed in Wittgenstein’s early thought. But this division is ab-
sent from his later thought. Our whole world-picture—fact, value, and everything
else—is the shadow of the concepts of our language. This view of language can
help us make sense of the phenomenon of culture crisis in a way a Russellian view
of language cannot.
Yet, it remains unclear if there is anything the individual can do to resolve
the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Chapter five will consider the sug-
gestion that appeal to a Wittgensteinian view of language renders the individual
unable to do anything about the problem of culture crisis. This suggestion rests
upon collectivist or communitarian readings of Wittgenstein’s view on language,
according to which language is essentially social. In the meantime, the next chapter
will introduce the Nietzschean individual. It will be suggested that if the individ-
ual is to solve the problem of culture crisis in her own case, she must be something
like the Nietzschean individual.
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THE NIETZSCHEAN INDIVIDUAL
Nietzsche is a highly controversial figure in the history of philosophy. In contrast
to Wittgenstein, the connection between Nietzsche’s thought and the human con-
dition is impossible to deny. More di cult is identifying something palatable and
coherent in his thought. After his works were appropriated for Nazi propaganda,
some commentators argued that his focus is the moral and individual, not the
political. More recently, philosophers and theorists have tried to extract from Ni-
etzsche a theory of the political centered around the noble individual. Perhaps
due to his blustering style and his uncompromising elitism, Nietzsche’s thought
tends to be received as somewhat sinister. Indeed, in a 2004 preface to his work
Nietzsche as Philosopher, Arthur Danto points to a high school massacre in Pearl
River, Mississippi as evidence that Nietzsche’s writings need to be deflated and
demythologized.100
While the connection to the human condition in Nietzsche’s work is uncon-
troversial, there is little consensus as to what the connection is. After a survey of
some of the literature, it will be suggested that the answer remains unclear because
Nietzsche interpretation tends to focus on one aspect of his thought and neglect
the others. An alternate interpretation will be presented according to which Niet-
zsche is a culture critic who examined politics, religion and morality, philosophy,
and science as symptoms of the state of culture in late nineteenth century Europe.
100Danto (2005), xiii.
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The aim of this chapter will be to isolate Nietzsche’s new philosopher, that dias-
poric class of individuals Nietzsche hoped would carry out a cultural revival. I will
refer to the new philosopher as the “Nietzschean individual.”
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL IN NIETZSCHE
In his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, published in 1950, Wal-
ter Kaufmann o ered one of the first comprehensive, post-World War II studies of
Nietzsche’s thought. One of his over-arching aims in this work was to domesticate
Nietzsche and distance him from the Nazis. To this end, Kaufmann argued that Ni-
etzsche was concerned with the individual rather than the political.101 Kaufmann
admits that Nietzsche was critical of the state, but, he counters, this criticism is
due to the fact that the state encourages mediocrity and is, thereby, inimical to the
individual.102 Other political comments, Kaufmann explains, are simply analogies
about the individual.103
Kaufmann’s project of domesticating Nietzsche extends beyond denying any
direct interest in the political. Indeed, Kaufmann also denies that Nietzsche is in-
terested in undermining or, to use a Nietzschean term, engaging in a revaluation of
our Christian moral values. Instead of engaging in a critique of our values, Kauf-
mann argues that Nietzsche’s revaluation is an internal criticism of our morality.
Nietzsche employs our values to show that our standards are “poisonously im-
moral.”104 Despite appearances, then, Nietzsche is not interested in undermining
or questioning our values. Such a project, Kaufmann insists, would only serve to
101Kaufmann (1950), 137, 210, 249, 357, 359.
102Kaufmann (1950), 103, 138-140, 357.
103Kaufmann (1950), 168-170, 174.
104Kaufmann (1950), 90-95.
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exacerbate the real problem.
Rather than the political or Christian morality, Kaufmann maintains that
Nietzsche’s major focus is nihilism.105 Kaufmann glosses nihilism as a condition
resulting from the realization that our values are worthless and, thereby, fail to
give our lives meaning.106 Unless it can be avoided, nihilism threatens to result
in chaos, social disorder, and “universal madness.”107 According to Kaufmann,
Nietzsche identifies the combination of Christianity and Darwinism as the source
of nihilism in nineteenth century Europe. Christianity, he explains, locates value
in God and the supernatural. Darwinism, on the other hand, denies God and thus
denies value altogether.108 Nihilism is the result of the realization that we are
animals and cannot even look to the supernatural for meaning or salvation from
our beastly state.
The unifying project of Nietzsche’s work, Kaufmann tells us, is to battle
this crisis of values. The problem is to restore the dignity of humankind while
acknowledging our animalic nature.109 Nietzsche, says Kaufmann, looks to the will
to power, self-overcoming, and the Übermensch to resolve the problem of nihilism.
The individual engages in self-overcoming, cultivating her nature so as to become
more rational, more like the Übermensch.110 The process of self-overcoming, on
Kaufmann’s picture, is a manifestation of the will to power. In self-overcoming
one’s reason exerts power on the chaos of one’s passions and impulses, giving them
order.111 Through progressive application of reason to the passions, one becomes
105Kaufmann (1950), 102.
106Kaufmann (1950), 103.
107Kaufmann (1950), 80-85, 142.
108Kaufmann (1950), 86.
109Kaufmann (1950), 137.
110Kaufmann (1950), 150, 160, 166.
111Kaufmann (1950), 193, 199, 204.
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more powerful, rational, and human.112 The individual comes more and more to
resemble the Übermensch, a powerful and throughly rational individual who lives
according to his own moral code.113
The Nietzsche with which Kaufmann presents us is a moral perfectionist.
On this picture, the moral individual is that person who strives to become an
Übermensch by employing reason to order and control her passions and impulses.
Kaufmann introduces this reason-passion distinction to resolve a conceptual prob-
lem related to self-overcoming. Namely, he needs two things: One to overcome the
other. While this understanding of self-overcoming is convenient, it fails to take ac-
count of Nietzsche’s thoroughly post-Enlightenment view of the self. Admittedly,
Kaufmann recognizes that Nietzsche rejects mind-body dualism.114 Nonetheless,
Kaufmann relies on dualism in his understanding of overcoming and we see it again
in his explanation of guilt.115 Without dualism, then, Kaufmann is unable to give
a coherent explanation of self-overcoming.
Arthur Danto attempts to deflate and demythologize Nietzsche in his Niet-
zsche as Philosopher by capitalizing on the di culty of making coherent the idea
of self-overcoming. Danto understands nihilism to be an outgrowth of Nietzsche’s
perspectivist theory of truth. According to this perspectivism, all our beliefs and
judgments are, strictly speaking, false.116 There is no possible metaphysical or
supernatural foundation for our beliefs and judgments.117 Rather, our beliefs and
112Kaufmann (1950), 213.
113Kaufmann (1950), 217-218, 267-272.
114Kaufmann (1950), 225-231.
115Kaufmann (1950), 220.
116Danto (2005), 15.
117Danto (2005), 17. The astute reader may note that the premise that our beliefs and judgments
are false does not follow trivially from the premise that our beliefs have no supernatural or
metaphysical foundation. Rather there is no basis for truth or falsity in this case. This is,
however, the view Danto attributes to Nietzsche. In the next chapter, I will examine Clark’s
reading of Nietzsche. Clark, a student of Danto, argues that Nietzsche assumes a metaphysical
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judgments are simply the implications of a system of concepts that we have laid on
the world, but we cannot get to anything in the world that makes this system cor-
rect or its truths true.118 Danto takes Nietzsche’s work to be directed at bringing
the empty conventionality of our beliefs and judgments to our attention.119 The
problem of nihilism, on Danto’s gloss, is the problem of how we manage to endure
our lives once we accept this fact.120
Danto hopes to undermine what he takes to be the more harmful aspects
of Nietzsche’s thought. Specifically, he tries to show that Nietzsche’s attempt to
unleash the amoral and “antisocial passions” of the individual rests upon an incon-
sistency.121 Danto claims that Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics commits him to
defending common sense.122 Common sense comes with its own standard of truth,
which Danto identifies as the “metaphysics of the herd.”123 The Nietzschean in-
dividual, being an antisocial non-conformist, is supposed to reject the beliefs and
standards of common sense. However, Danto argues, the individual cannot get
outside the perspective he’s been socialized into in order to critique it.124 He can-
not overcome. In Danto’s words “we remain forever imprisioned within ramified
structures which, like spiders, we have produced ourselves. . . ”125 Though Niet-
zsche’s perspectivism motivated his encouraging the individual to overcome, this
correspondence theory of truth according to which a belief is true if and only if it has a foundation
in the metaphysical or supernatural. I argue in the next chapter that this is a misreading of
Nietzsche. It seems, however, that this assumption belongs to Danto.
118Danto (2005), 12, 14-15, 49.
119Danto (2005), 80.
120Danto (2005), 17, 50.
121Danto (2005), 127.
122Danto (2005), 57.
123Danto (2005), 59.
124Danto (2005), 60. This criticism is, of course, reminiscent of the conservative reading of
Wittgenstein. Indeed, Danto explicitly refers to Wittgenstein in building up this criticism of
Nietzsche. Danto (2005), 104.
125Danto (2005), 82-83.
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same perspectivism makes this impossible. Without the Nietzschean individual,
Danto argues, Nietzsche’s work serves to show how thoroughly socialized we are.126
More recently there has been a revival of interest in the political aspects
of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that we cannot begin
to understand Nietzsche’s thought without considering the role of the political.127
Over-emphasis on the individual, Ansell-Pearson suggests, has lead to the mistaken
impression that Nietzsche’s thought is compatible with liberal individualism.128 On
the contrary, says Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche argues that the point of a political
system is to encourage culture and the production of great individuals.129 This
goal requires a form of aristocracy led by philosopher-legislators.130 On this “great
politics” reading of Nietzsche, philosopher-legislators will legislate new values and
use their power to further culture and create a race of super-humans.131
In further contrast to Kaufmann and Danto, Ansell-Pearson takes the cen-
tral problem to be the relationship between the individual and society.132 The
opportunity to consider this relationship arises due to the crisis of authority cre-
ated by nihilism.133 However, it is this very same crisis of authority that stands
in the way of Nietzsche’s great politics project. According to Ansell-Pearson,
Nietzsche’s project requires overcoming the idea that politics serves the ends of
morality. He seeks to replace them with the aesthetic project of creating a race of
126Danto (2005), 105, 119, 121, 126.
127Ansell-Pearson (1994), 11, 97.
128Ansell-Pearson (1994), 9.
129Ansell-Pearson (1994), 120, 129.
130Ansell-Pearson (1994), 7, 50-52, 129, 148, 151.
131Ansell-Pearson (1994), 120, 147-148.
132Ansell-Pearson (1994), 97.
133Ansell-Pearson (1994), 8, 102, 147, 204.
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super-humans.134 Nietzsche attempts this replacement by undermining the meta-
physical and supernatural foundations of morality. But, Ansell-Pearson observes,
this project involves an appeal to us as beings constituted by the very morality Ni-
etzsche is trying to undermine. Central to Nietzsche’s great politics project, then,
is the self-overcoming of morality. It’s not clear, however, where Nietzsche’s deeply
immoral philosopher-legislators are meant to get authority for this project.135 The
problem of self-overcoming, then, appears even on this political reading of Niet-
zsche.
In his Nietzsche and the Political, Daniel Conway also explores the political
in Nietzsche. Like Ansell-Pearson, Conway sees Nietzsche as arguing that it is
the point of politics to cultivate great individuals.136 Such individuals justify
the continued existence of the human race.137 It is through their experiments
in living and heroic exploits that they redeem humanity.138 However, Nietzsche
recognized that modern political institutions were incapable of pursuing such goals.
This political incapacity is simply a manifestation of the decline of culture in the
modern era.139 Rather than state legislation, Conway argues, Nietzsche turns to
a perfectionist moral self-legislation.140 Such self-legislation, Nietzsche hopes, will
serve as a model and a temptation to others to aspire to human greatness.141
Nietzsche’s political revolution, Conway explains, will take place on a local level,
centered around self-legislating individuals.142 Though Conway’s turn to the moral
134Ansell-Pearson (1994), 120.
135Ansell-Pearson (1994), 102, 132, 154.
136Conway (1996), 2-4, 6, 18-26.
137Conway (1996), 7.
138Conway (1996), 7, 9, 12-13.
139Conway (1996), 43-47, 55.
140Conway (1996), 55, 61, 63, 68, 74, 80.
141Conway (1996), 80-81.
142Conway (1996), 85-98.
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avoids Ansell-Pearson’s crisis of authority, his turn to moral perfectionism renders
his view, like Kaufmann’s, unable to make sense of overcoming.
David Owen puts a twist on the political reading of Nietzsche in his Niet-
zsche, Politics & Modernity. Rather than advocating a particular political system,
Owen reads Nietzsche as leveling a critique directed at liberalism.143 According
to this critique, liberalism is an obstacle to the existence of noble individuals in
the modern era.144 Owen provides an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals on
which Nietzsche undermines the conception of reason and the abstract individual
which are central to liberalism.145 This genealogical project is meant to display
our development into modern individuals such that we can critically reflect on
ourselves and, ideally, overcome liberalism.146
Key to Nietzsche’s project, on Owen’s reading, are the characters of the last
man and the overman (the Übermensch). Owen claims these are the two human
types Nietzsche thinks possible in the modern era.147 The last man is meant to
be the pitiful product of nihilistic liberalism whereas the overman is meant to be
the noble individual possible only as the result of the overcoming of liberalism.148
Elsewhere Owen argues that the persuasive power of the overman is due to our
commitment to the Enlightenment ideal of self-government.149 What makes the
overman attractive is precisely his capacity to set his own goals and pursue them
whereas the liberal last man lacks goals and integrity.150 As such, the overman is
143Owen (1995), 4.
144Owen (1995), 8-9, 133.
145Owen (1995), 9, 27-28, 33, 138.
146Owen (1995), 39, 54, Cf. Owen (2003).
147Owen (1995), 105.
148Owen (1995), 105, 111, 122-123, 125.
149Owen (1999), esp. 3, 25-27.
150Owen (1995), 123, Owen (1999), 25-26.
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meant to induce us to overcome liberalism.151 According to this interpretation, the
aim of genealogy is to free us from a particular perspective in order to prepare us
for revaluation and overcoming, but again in what self-overcoming consists remains
unclear.152
Robert Pippin’s interpretation of genealogy in his Nietzsche, Psychology &
First Philosophy parallels Owen’s. Genealogy is meant to free us from a particular
perspective or picture. However, Pippin believes the target is our Christian-moral
commitments.153 Pippin reorients the discussion by taking seriously Nietzsche’s
insistence that he is engaging in psychology. What this amounts to, Pippin ar-
gues, is an interest in the origin and force of our values.154 Pippin suggests that
the problem of nihilism is a lack of desire resulting from a decline in our “erotic
attachment” to our values.155 Nietzsche’s project, then, is one of identifying a so-
lution to this “collective failure of desire.”156 The solution lies in achieving freedom
via self-overcoming which allows one to identify with one’s values and actions.157
Pippin argues, however, that the project of overcoming requires certain social and
historical conditions which are not under the control of the individual.158 Instead
of providing a solution to the problem of nihilism, Pippin claims, Nietzsche o ers
us methods of enduring its debilitating e ects.159
151Owen (1995), 128, Cf. Owen (1999), 25, 27.
152Cf. Owen (2002), Owen (2003).
153Pippin (2010), 29, 45.
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NIETZSCHE AS CULTURE CRITIC
Nietzsche has been interpreted as a moral philosopher, a political philosopher, and
as both at the same time. These interpretations, however, often fail to fit the
various aspects of Nietzsche’s thought together. As we saw in Kaufmann, focus-
ing on the moral led him to awkwardly interpret Nietzsche’s political comments
as indirectly about the individual. Ansell-Pearson makes no e ort to incorporate
Nietzsche’s comments on philosophy or science. Owen’s cast of Nietzsche’s work
as a critique of liberalism can only awkwardly account for his comments on Chris-
tianity, philosophy, or science. Further, none of these interpretations is able to give
a coherent and non-metaphorical account of overcoming.
Nietzsche is infamous for being the nihilist philosopher who announced the
death of God. There is a tendency in Nietzsche interpretation, as we see in Danto,
to take Nietzsche’s announcement as an urgent insistence that we give up our
Christian morality and any other beliefs or judgments that rest on putative meta-
physical or supernatural grounds.160 This is Nietzsche’s supposed perspectivism.
Though these beliefs give our lives meaning, according to this reading, Nietzsche
tells us that these beliefs are groundless and therefore false. Nihilism is the result
of realizing the groundlessness of these beliefs. Without these beliefs that give our
lives meaning, the best we can hope for is to find some means of enduring our
existence.161
As we saw above, Danto’s reading turns on the falsehood of our beliefs and
judgments. However, Nietzsche doesn’t take falsehood to be ground for rejecting
a belief or judgment. In Beyond Good & Evil, for instance, Nietzsche says, “The
160Cf. Danto (2005), 12-17, 80.
161Cf. Danto (2005), 29, 173-174.
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falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment. . . The
question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving,
perhaps even species-cultivating.”162 Nietzsche may believe that our beliefs and
judgments are, strictly speaking, false, but this is irrelevant to the question of
whether we should retain them. Indeed, Nietzsche insists that “the falsest judg-
ments. . . are the most indispensable for us” and if we were to renounce them that
“would mean renouncing life and a denial of life.”163 Our lives are such that we
need some beliefs and judgments. Nietzsche’s critique of Christian morality must
rest on something other than the nonexistence of God.
Examination of his criticism of Christian morality reveals that Nietzsche
doesn’t object to Christianity as a whole, but rather its modern variant. In com-
paring the Old and New Testaments, he says, “all honor to the Old Testament!
I find in it great human beings, a heroic landscape, and something of the very
rarest quality in the world, the incomparable naïveté of the strong heart. . . ”164
Such great human beings are absent from the New Testament. Nietzsche notes
a parallel development in our conception of God. “Formerly,” he says, “he [God]
represented a people, the strength of a people, everything aggressive and thirsting
for power in the soul of a people: now he is merely a good God. . . ”165 What
is objectionable about Christianity, then, is not its falsehood or its supernatural
foundations, but something about its modern variant.
Nietzsche objects to the modern variant of Christianity because it is char-
acterized by a morality of pity. Such pity, he claims, is hostile to life.166 “God,”
162Nietzsche (1992a), 201.
163Nietzsche (1992a), 201.
164Nietzsche (1992b), 580.
165Nietzsche (1968a), 126, Cf. Nietzsche (1992b), 526.
166Nietzsche (1968a), 118-119.
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he says, has “degenerated to the contradiction of life. . . a declaration of hostil-
ity towards life. . . ”167 But Christianity is not the only place in which Nietzsche
sees this modern penchant for pity. He insists it permeates all aspects of modern
life.168 He sees it in the social and political institutions of the modern era, in
the rise of democracy and equality.169 Speaking in Beyond Good & Evil of the
democratic movement in Europe, Nietzsche says, “behind all the moral and polit-
ical foregrounds. . . a tremendous physiological process is taking place and gaining
momentum.”170 He sees it reflected in the philosophy of his day, which he insists is
primarily directed at providing ad hoc justifications for the judgments we accept
uncritically.171 Nietzsche also sees this pity on display in Darwin’s theory of evo-
lution, which holds up the mediocre mass as the acme of human development.172
These values, he claims, are the values of declining life—of decadence.173
The whole of modernity is characterized by pity and the values of deca-
dence. But this is not Nietzsche’s central claim. Rather, he says, “Our softening of
customs—this is my thesis, my innovation if you like—is a consequence of decline;
stern and frightful customs can, conversely, be a consequence of a superabundance
of life.”174 Nietzsche’s central insight, then, is that the cultural decline of modernity
signals a general decline of life, vitality, or health.175 Modern man is sick.176
If this is right then understanding Nietzsche requires that we make sense
167Nietzsche (1968a), 128, Cf. Nietzsche (1969), 73.
168Nietzsche (1968a), 117, 120.
169Nietzsche (1992a), 306, Nietzsche (1968b), 91, Nietzsche (1968a), 156.
170Nietzsche (1992a), 366.
171Nietzsche (1992a), 200, 202-204, 287, Nietzsche (1968b), 35-39.
172Nietzsche (1968b), 75-76, Nietzsche (1968a), 124, Nietzsche (1992b), 478-480, Nietzsche
(1969), 138.
173Nietzsche (1968a), 117.
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175Cf. Conway (1996), 45.
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of his claim that modern man is sick. Danto insists that it is unclear what he
means by this.177 Contra Danto, I suggest we take seriously Nietzsche’s claim
that he is engaged in a physio-psychological investigation.178 This approach is
similar in spirit to Pippin’s suggestion that we consider Nietzsche’s thought as a
psychological investigation. The di erence lies in giving equal emphasis to the role
the body plays. The very idea of sickness suggests the body plays an important
role in Nietzsche’s thought.
There is significant textual evidence to support this physio-psychological
reading. In The Anti-Christ Nietzsche insists that Christianity requires individuals
who are both physically and intellectually sick or weak.179 In Twilight of the
Idols Nietzsche suggests that the idea of sin or guilt is simply an interpretation
“foisted upon a physiological discomfort.”180 In Beyond Good & Evil he describes
pleasure and pain as “mere epiphenomena” of having or lacking power.181 In
Genealogy of Morals power is described in physio-psychological terms as the feeling
accompanying an expenditure of strength.182 Indeed, physicality, life, strength and
weakness, health and illness are motifs present throughout Nietzsche’s analysis of
values and culture.
This physio-psychological analysis reveals a dynamic relationship between
culture and the individual. A culture preserves and promotes certain kinds of in-
dividuals by means of its particular moral valuations.183 These moral valuations
are interpretations of our physio-psychological experiences or characteristics.184
177Danto (2005), 170-171.
178Nietzsche (1992a), 221.
179Nietzsche (1968a), 167, 169.
180Nietzsche (1968b), 52, Cf. Nietzsche (1992b), 565.
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Nietzsche tells us that there are two kinds of morality: noble and slave moral-
ity.185 The di erence between these two moralities is their respective valuation of
power and strength.186 Central to noble morality is a positive valuation of power
and strength.187 Slave morality, on the other hand, gives a negative valuation of
these characteristics. Nietzsche argues that slave morality, which makes power and
strength into an evil, developed out of hatred and resentment of the nobles.188 By
making power and strength a moral fault the weaker class are able to exert power
over the stronger class.
The particular moral valuations of a culture have long-term consequences
on the physio-psychological constitution of the individuals of that culture. These
valuations preserve and promote certain physio-psychological kinds of individuals.
Modern culture is characterized by a Christian morality of pity, which is a type of
slave morality. Modern culture has, thereby, encouraged a weak kind of individual
to prosper. The predominance of Christian morality, Nietzsche insists, has created
“a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly,
and mediocre has been bred, the European of today.”189 The weak and sick men
of modernity, then, are the result of a culture characterized by a slave morality.190
Nietzsche tells us that the truth or falsity of a judgment is not a basis
for rejecting that judgment. Rather, the “question is to what extent it is life-
promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.”191
While we cannot judge a culture on the truth or falsity of its judgments, we can
185Nietzsche (1992a), 394-398.
186Nietzsche (1992b), 476.
187Nietzsche (1992b), 462.
188Nietzsche (1992b), 472-475.
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ask whether it promotes life. “Life” in the sense in which Nietzsche uses it refers
to a physio-psychological process characterized by su ering. Healthy and happy
individuals are those with the strength to endure and embrace the su ering which
accompanies living. Nietzsche identifies the Dionysian Hellenes as one such people.
The Hellenes, according to Nietzsche, were able “realize in onself the eternal joy
of becoming—that joy which also encompasses joy in destruction. . . ”192 He isn’t
interested in the survival of large numbers of individuals, but in the quality of the
individual’s life.193 An abundance of strong, healthy, and happy individuals signals
a good, ascending culture.
A culture in decline, on the other hand, is indicated by an abundance of
weak, sick, and unhappy individuals. Sick and unhappy individuals are those
without the strength to endure and embrace su ering. Weak individuals, Niet-
zsche claims, look for ways of living which promise to eradicate su ering.194 The
Christian morality of pity has provided such a way of living.195 Christianity teaches
one to deny the body, instincts, and passions.196 In e ect, Nietzsche argues, mod-
ern Christian life is like unto a kind of living death.197 It solves the problem of
life—su ering—by teaching us to live in a way that denies that life is a bodied
experience characterized by su ering. The life of modern man, Nietzsche says, is
a “physiological self-contradiction.”198
Though we cannot judge a culture on its claim to truth, we can judge it
192Nietzsche (1968b), 110, Cf. Nietzsche (1992a), 254.
193Nietzsche (1968b), 98, Nietzsche (1992a), 211. It is unclear whether Danto understands that
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according to the kind of individuals it produces. Modernity, Nietzsche observes,
is characterized by an abundance of weak and sick individuals and a dearth of
strong characters.199 “Great men,” he says “are explosive material. . . there has
been no explosion for a long time.”200 Modern culture is in decline. The valu-
ations of modernity fail to give meaning to our su ering. Instead, modernity is
characterized by a way of life that denies life. The valuations of modernity must
be rejected because they fail to help us endure and embrace life. Moreover, these
moral valuations contribute to the problem because they preserve and promote
weak kinds of individuals.
Nietzsche’s announcement that God has died, then, is the announcement
that the way of life centered around the ideal of God no longer serves its function.
Modern culture fails to help the modern man make sense of his life and its char-
acteristic su ering. While God used to inspire stories of strong individuals, in the
modern era he has become the idol of the weak.201 The values of pity in evidence
in the politics, philosophy, and science of late nineteenth century Europe signal a
physio-psychological decline. What we need in order to reverse the trend of decline
is a new ideal and a fundamental shift of our valuations toward a noble morality.202
Nietzsche prescribes the Übermensch and a new noble moral valuation.203
THE NIETZSCHEAN INDIVIDUAL
It was stated above that Nietzsche sees a dynamic relationship between culture
and the individual. So far, only the e ect of culture on the individual has been
199Nietzsche (1969), 300.
200Nietzsche (1968b), 97.
201Cf. Nietzsche (1969), 272-273, Nietzsche (1968a), 162-163.
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explored. The problem of nihilism in the modern era, however, requires that
individuals a ect—indeed, a ect a revolution in—culture. Nietzsche insists the
culture of the modern era needs to be replaced. We need to change the valuations
of our culture. The question, as several commentators point out, is whether the
individual can do this.
Nietzsche recognizes the di culty of this problem. In Thus Spoke Zarathus-
tra, Zarathustra asks his fellow higher men, “Who could overturn with reasons what
the mob has once learned to believe without reasons?”204 Speaking to the Stoics
in Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche says, “For all your love of truth, you have forced
yourselves so long, so persistently, so rigidly-hypnotically to see nature the wrong
way, namely Stoically, that you are no longer able to see her di erently. . . ”205 This
is especially the case with Christian morality. Modern man, Nietzsche notes, in-
creasingly rejects God and the tenets of Christianity and yet continues to live in
accordance with Christian moral values.206 The decadent values of modernity are
so persistent because modern man is a product of the culture of modernity.
The key is that Nietzsche doesn’t look to the modern man to carry out this
cultural revival. Instead, he looks to the new philosopher. The new philosopher
is the diasporic class of individuals with the strength and ability to carry out
a cultural revival. But Nietzsche is at turns hesitant and insistent about their
appearance. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra looks to the higher men to
“write upon new law-tables the word: ‘Noble’.”207 At the end of the story, the
higher men accept a donkey as their God and Zarathustra wonders “Who shall
204Nietzsche (1969), 300.
205Nietzsche (1992a), 206.
206Nietzsche (1968a), 149-150, Nietzsche (1968b), 527, Nietzsche (1992a), 259-261.
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be master of the world?”208 At one point in Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche is
adamant, “Toward new philosophers; there is no choice. . . ,” but later he reprises
his hesitancy, “And to ask it one more: today—is greatness possible?”209 He is
again insistent in the Genealogy of Morals saying, “—he must come one day—
.”210 This wa ing reflects Nietzsche’s desperation for a cultural revival as well
as his pessimism that it will occur. He thinks that if a reversal of our valuations
is to occur it will only be as a result of the e orts of the new philosophers—our
Nietzschean individual.211
Though his hesitance and pessimism is evident, Nietzsche is hopeful. His
hope lies in his belief that the conditions of the modern era are perfect for the
appearance of the Nietzschean individual. He believes that precisely the social
conditions which serve to exacerbate the decline in modern culture provide the
opportunity for its reversal. The higher and weaker types of men, he says, “belong
together and owe their origins to the same causes.”212 The modern era has seen
an increase in cross-cultural reproduction. Such “inter-breeding” of the peoples of
Europe, Nietzsche thinks, has created individuals in which various and conflicting
cultural valuations compete. The resulting internal conflict unsettles the influence
of culture:
The past of every form and way of life, or cultures that formerly lay
right next to each other or one on top of the other, now flows into
us ‘modern souls,’ thanks to this mixture; our instincts now run back
everywhere; we ourselves are a kind of chaos.213
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This cultural confusion, then, creates individuals who experience internal confu-
sion. Their instincts, their bodies, and sensibilities have not been irreversibly
shaped by any one culture.214
Without a coherent culture to shape them these individuals are in a unique
position. The majority of these individuals will succumb to the confusion and
join the weak mass. But Nietzsche thinks a few individuals will have the strength
to impose their own order and valuations on the chaos of their instincts.215 Such
individuals, Nietzsche believes, will take advantage of the tension of their souls cre-
ated by these competing valuations.216 They will overcome themselves by imposing
order on the chaos of their instincts and, thereby, create new valuations.
Overcoming, then, consists in providing an alternate interpretation, a new
moral valuation, an order to the chaos of one’s own physio-psychological experience
and characteristics. But not any new interpretation will do. Nietzsche o ers the
Übermensch as an ideal to center the valuations of the Nietzschean individuals.
This ideal embodies the characteristics of the noble individual. The Übermensch
is the strong human animal who creates values.217 A culture centered on such an
ideal should preserve and promote strong and noble individuals.
What Nietzsche envisioned as the relationship between the Nietzschean in-
dividuals and the rest of society is not obvious. It is clear that Nietzsche does not
think everyone can be a noble individual. The class of noble individuals require “a
broad base. . . a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity.”218 The weak mass
cannot be eradicated because the noble class needs them.219 Some commentators
214Nietzsche (1992a), 301-302.
215Cf. Nietzsche (1992b), 488.
216Nietzsche (1992b), 521, Nietzsche (1992a), 193.
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read this as evidence advocating an aristocracy centered around noble individu-
als. Indeed, the Nietzchean individual is particularly politicized in Beyond Good
& Evil. “Genuine philosophers,” Nietzsche says, “are commanders and legislators:
they say, ‘thus it shall be!’ ”220
This politicized rendering of the philosopher-legislator, however, is out of
place in the rest of Nietzsche’s works. He frequently encourages the higher types to
seek solitude. For instance, in expounding on the concept of the noble, Nietzsche
says, “solitude is a virtue for us. . . All community makes men—somehow, some-
where, sometime ‘common.’ ”221 The process of overcoming, then, is a process of
self-legislating, a process of imposing form and creating valuations on one’s own
physio-psychological experience and characteristics. In describing the Nietzschean
individual, Nietzsche seems to have in mind a philosopher-hermit, like Zarathus-
tra. Indeed, the one manifestation of the ascetic ideal of which Nietzsche approves
occurs in philosophers. In the solitude and self-discipline encouraged by the ascetic
ideal, the philosopher finds the “optimum of favorable conditions under which it
can expend its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power. . . ”222 Though
Nietzsche was likely attracted to the idea of philosopher-legislators, the bulk of his
discussion on this topic indicates an individual self-legislating and creating new
values for herself.
This is not to say that the upshot of Nietzsche’s work is to encourage in-
dividuals to go live in caves and keep their new values only for themselves. He
clearly envisions the activities of the Nietzschean individual as having far-reaching
cultural implications. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he has Zarathustra say, “The
220Nietzsche (1992a), 326.
221Nietzsche (1992a), 416, Cf. Nietzsche (1969), 77, Nietzsche (1992a), 275, 412, Nietzsche
(1992b), 545, 561, 572.
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world revolves about the inventor of new values: imperceptibly it revolves.”223 By
creating new values and a new culture around the ideal of the Übermensch, Niet-
zschean individuals will also recreate humankind. But the task of creating a new
culture and, thereby, recreating humankind will require generations of e ort.224
In the meantime, Nietzsche is fervently calling on these individuals, desperately
encouraging them to continue being great in an era dominated by the weak.225
The fate of humankind, he warns, depends on it.
Central to Nietzsche’s appeal to the Nietzschean individual is the idea that
human beings are creative animals. We are animals in the sense that we are
physio-psychological beings. We are bodied. We have instincts and passions.
But we are also creative in that we interpret our physio-psychological experiences
and characteristics. We provide a moral valuation of the physio-psychological
which permeates our culture. Through this valuation we preserve and promote a
particular kind of life and particular kinds of individuals. Individuals are products
of their culture, but culture is, ultimately, a human creation. Thus, in order to
overcome and, thereby, carry out a cultural revival, the Nietzschean individuals
have to recognize that we are creative animals.226 They have to become what they
are.227
This is where Nietzsche’s insistence that there is no supernatural or meta-
physical truth becomes important. As he notes, the grip of Christian morality
is di cult to escape because it denies the possibility of other interpretations.228
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Its putative supernatural foundations rule out competing claims to truth and its
rejection of the body, the senses, and the empirical rule out potential contrary
evidence.229 His persistent reminders that all interpretations are false, then, are
meant to free us from the grip of Christian morality.230 Nietzsche’s point is that
the valuations of this morality are damaging, but there is nothing necessary about
them. They are only one of many interpretations that we can construct.231 In
denying supernatural and metaphysical truth, Nietzsche means to bring to our
attention our nature as creators. “In man,” he says, “creature and creator are
united. . . ”232 Rather than committing us to the fate of nihilism, as Danto sug-
gests, Nietzsche’s rejection of objective truth frees us to create new valuations and
give meaning to our lives for ourselves.
On Nietzsche’s physio-psychological analysis of culture, modern man is in
a state of decline. Broadly, the problem Nietzsche sees is that the culture of late
nineteenth century Europe does not help individuals make sense of their lives.
This is the same kind of problem as that facing our individual caught in a mo-
ment of culture crisis. Nietzsche looks to the new philosopher—our Nietzschean
individual—to resolve this problem. He hopes the Nietzschean individual will
carry out a cultural revival through the process of overcoming. In order to resolve
the problem of culture crisis in her own case, then, our individual must be a Niet-
zschean individual. She must overcome and provide herself with new interpretation
and moral valuation.
229Nietzsche (1968a), 164-165.
230Cf. Nietzsche (1992a), 201, 212, 219, 235-236, Nietzsche (1968b), 36.
231Nietzsche (1992a), 249, 287-288, Nietzsche (1992b), 515.
232Nietzsche (1992a), 344.
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This chapter opened with a survey of interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought.
It was argued that these di erent interpretations su ered from common di culties
and failed to give a coherent account of overcoming. In order to address these
common interpretive problems, I o ered an alternate physio-psychological read-
ing. This physio-psychological interpretation took seriously Nietzsche’s talk about
health, strength, and power and focused on the dynamic relationship between hu-
man beings and culture.
According to this physio-psychological interpretation, Nietzsche literally
means that modern man is sick. Modern culture fails to give man the means to
endure and embrace the su ering characteristic of life. It fails to help modern man
make sense of his life. To resolve this problem Nietzsche looks to the Nietzschean
individual to engage in overcoming and, thereby, to carry out a cultural revival.
Overcoming involves giving form and order to the chaos of one’s instincts by pro-
viding a new interpretation of physio-psychological experiences and characteristics.
This account of overcoming remains highly metaphorical. The next chapter will
develop a non-metaphorical account of overcoming by looking to Nietzsche’s view
of the nature of language.
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MAKING SENSE OF NIETZSCHE
Though there is wide variety in Nietzsche interpretation, few commentators have
concentrated on his philosophy of language. An implication of the physio-psych-
ological analysis of Nietzsche’s thought presented in the previous chapter is that
the notion of overcoming is central to his thought. As the Nietzschean individ-
ual is supposed to carry out Nietzsche’s hoped-for cultural revival by engaging in
overcoming, Nietzsche’s project rests on the coherence of this idea. More impor-
tantly for our purposes, the fate of our individual caught in a moment of culture
crisis relies on overcoming. We must, then, find a non-metaphorical account of
this notion.
This chapter will suggest that Nietzsche’s philosophy of language is essential
to this task. However, Nietzsche’s lack of prowess in the philosophy of language has
left his thought open to allegedly debilitating criticism such as Danto’s. In contrast,
Maudemarie Clark gives an extensive defense of the development of Nietzsche’s
thought on language and truth. Unfortunately, this defense gets the character of
Nietzsche’s view wrong and ends up deflating Nietzsche just as Danto set out to do.
After examining Clark’s defense, this chapter will argue that we need something
like a Wittgensteinian view of language in order to make sense of Nietzsche’s idea
of overcoming.
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NIETZSCHE AS A NEO-KANTIAN
As was seen in the previous chapter, Athur Danto attempts to deflate and de-
mythologize Nietzsche by showing that his view involves an internal contradiction.
According to Danto’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivist theory of truth, all
our beliefs and judgments are, strictly speaking, false. There are no metaphysical
or supernatural grounds that privilege any system of beliefs or judgments over an-
other. As these beliefs and judgments are false we have no right to them. Danto’s
Nietzsche encourages the individual to free herself from these beliefs and judgments
and, thereby, unleash her antisocial passions. The problem, says Danto, is that
Nietzsche’s perspectivism renders this move impossible. There is no perspective
from which the individual can criticize the collective perspective.233
This perspectivist theory of truth poses an additional problem for Nietzsche
as it renders the status of his claims unclear. It seems as though his perspectivism
amounts to the claim that there is no truth and that is the truth. This is a plain
contradiction. Nietzsche can attempt to avoid this contradiction by forwarding a
weaker perspectivist claim. On this weaker version, the claim is just an articulation
of Nietzsche’s own perspective. However, this weaker version makes it unclear why
we should find his claims compelling. Consider his critique of Christianity. Niet-
zsche says we should abandon modern Christian moral values because they are not
life-a rming. However, according to the weaker version of his perspectivism, this
is just Nietzsche’s perspective. That Nietzsche has these opinions about Christian-
ity has no necessary implications for us.234 Nietzsche’s perspectivism, then, seems
to pose two serious problems for his thought.
233Danto (2005), 119-127, Clark (1990), 1-3.
234Cf. Clark (1990), 3-4. Clark (1990), 151.
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I suggested in the previous chapter that this reading of perspectivism is a
misinterpretation of Nietzsche. This chapter will present a more sustained argu-
ment. This argument will focus on the work of Maudemarie Clark, a student of
Danto’s, who presents a more developed version of his reading in her 1990 Niet-
zsche on Truth and Philosophy. Though Clark defends Nietzsche, her argument
depends on Danto’s interpretation. She agrees with Danto that Nietzsche’s early
perspectivism undermines his project. However, she argues that Nietzsche’s view
on truth only takes final form after Beyond Good & Evil. She characterizes his
mature perspectivism as a kind of neo-Kantian view of truth, which, she argues,
allows him to avoid the problems that plague his early views.
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense is a 1873 essay by Nietzsche. It
is one of his most extensive treatments of the topic of truth and the nature of
language. In this essay Nietzsche likens truths to illusions. Clark argues that this
assertion commits him to the claim that all beliefs that we call “true” are actually
false. “He must mean,” says Clark, “that we are mistaken concerning the beliefs
we call ‘true,’ that these beliefs are false rather than true. . . To deny this is to
reject logic.”235 The di erence between truth and lies, Nietzsche explains, is not
a matter of truth or falsehood, but rather of social convention. If a statement
conforms to conventions, it is true. If not, it is false.236 According to this view,
there are no truths, but only socially accepted and sanctioned conventions. This
is Danto’s perspectivism.
Nietzsche’s rejection of truth rests upon a view of language as metaphor.
Regarding this view of language, Nietzsche says:
235Clark (1990), 66.
236Clark (1990), 67.
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. . . we believe that we know something about the things themselves
when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess
nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no
way to the original entities.237
Though we think we are speaking about the constituents of the world, our concepts
are only metaphors for things in the world. Our beliefs are not and cannot be true
because our language does not correspond directly with the things in the world.
Clark argues, however, that this view of language is not su cient for Niet-
zsche’s rejection of truth. This rejection requires two further premises. The first is
a representational theory of perception according to which we do not perceive the
world in a direct and unmediated fashion.238 The second premise is a metaphysical
correspondence theory of truth according to which a proposition is true if and only
if it corresponds to things-in-themselves.239
Taken together, Clark argues, these three premises lead Nietzsche to what
Clark refers to as the “falsification thesis.” According to the falsification thesis
our beliefs falsify reality. It amounts, Clark says, “to calling the empirical world,
the world accessible through common sense and science, illusory or fictitious.”240
Our beliefs are not true because our concepts do not correspond to things-in-
themselves. Further, our beliefs cannot be true because all our evidence about
237Nietzsche (1979), 82-83.
238Cf. Danto (2005), 27-35. It is actually unclear if Nietzsche is committed to this. Nietzsche
comments about perception, “What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus. But
the further inference from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already the result of
a false and unjustifiable application of the principle of su cient reason.” Nietzsche (1979), 81.
Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that we do not have grounds to decide about the relationship
between our sense evidence and the external world. Clark’s gloss takes Nietzsche to assume that
our sense evidence distorts reality. This gloss, however, is clearly in tension with Nietzsche’s
advocacy of epistemological agnosticism. In addition, it is interesting to compare Nietzsche with
Russell on this topic. If Nietzsche is an agnostic, Russell seems to be an evangelic.
239Clark (1990), 77-85.
240Clark (1990), 114.
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things-in-themselves is distorted.241
Clark claims that Nietzsche’s rejection of truth is a result of his failure to
suppose there might be a non-metaphysical account of truth.242 Clark argues that
Nietzsche ultimately rejects the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth be-
cause it relies on the concept of the thing-in-itself.243 If truth were independent
of our cognitive interests, then it would depend upon the structure of reality—
the thing-in-itself—independently of our interests and concepts. On such a view,
truth might be completely inaccessible to us. In that case we would be unable to
conceive of the thing-in-itself. But a concept that cannot be conceived is a con-
tradiction. This rejection of the thing-in-itself lays the foundation for his mature
perspectivism, which, Clark argues, amounts to a denial that truth is independent
of our interests and concepts.244
Clark argues that the later Nietzsche realized—or should have realized—
that his objection to a metaphysical conception of truth does not commit him
to rejecting truth all together. She notes that it is unclear whether the later
Nietzsche realized this, but nonetheless argues that if there is no thing-in-itself
there is nothing for our beliefs to falsify. Further, she claims, there is no evidence
of the falsification thesis in his works after Beyond Good & Evil. We see “no
claim that the human world is a falsification, no claim that science, logic, or
241It is not obvious that this is what Nietzsche means by his comments on our senses. More on
this later.
242Clark (1990), 83.
243Clark argues that, at bottom, Nietzsche rejects the metaphysical because it “expresses the
nihilistic ascetic ideal.” Clark (1990), 23. According to Clark’s Nietzsche the metaphysically-
centered perspective of the ascetic ideal should be rejected because it “no longer encourages
widespread self-discipline or restraint” and has “stripped life of any intrinsic value.” Clark (1990),
166. This reading of the terms “life-a rming” or “life-promoting” as benefitting “human life in
general” by promoting peace, undermining aggression, promoting survival of the greatest number,
and avoiding mass depression understandably parallel’s Danto’s reading, but as was suggested in
the previous chapter this reading is not true to Nietzsche’s meaning. Cf. Clark (1990), 163-165.
244Clark (1990), 50-61.
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mathematics falsify reality.”245 Indeed, she says, the later Nietzsche is a friend
of common sense and science. If there is no independent metaphysical reality,
she observes, the absence of metaphysical truth implies nothing for science or our
common sense beliefs. A common sense or “minimal correspondence conception”
of truth is consistent with his objections to metaphysics.246 It is the presence
of these two conceptions of truth—common sense and metaphysical—that leads
Clark to characterize Nietzsche as a neo-Kantian.247
Clark attributes to Nietzsche a neo-Kantian view of truth in order to save
his view from the serious problems of the perspectivism attributed to him by Danto.
However, though she sets out to argue that Nietzsche is a neo-Kantian and did
maintain a neo-Kantian view of truth in his later works, her argument is largely
provisional and speculative. Her argument rests on a lack of contrary evidence and
her insistence that her neo-Kantian interpretation is “more plausible” or “obvious”
despite noting comments of Nietzsche’s that suggest against her reading.248 She
maintains her characterization of Nietzsche as a neo-Kantian despite his persistent
criticism of Kant and her own admission that Kant maintained that reality has an
independent structure whereas Nietzsche denies this.249
Additionally, Clark’s interpretation of Nietzsche and his views of language
and truth are unable to give us a robust understanding of nihilism and overcoming.
As she glosses it, nihilism is a morale problem arising out of the realization that our
beliefs and judgments have no metaphysical or supernatural foundation. Without
this source of meaning, she says, “it will be di cult to work up a great deal of
245Clark (1990), 103, Cf. 105.
246Clark (1990), 31, 135.
247Clark (1990), 22, 31, 103-115, 133-135. The common sense and metaphysical conceptions of
truth are meant to roughly map onto Kant’s phenomenal and noumenal truth.
248Clark (1990), 103, 106, 117-118, 127.
249Clark (1990), 61.
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enthusiasm for living and doing.”250 Overcoming, on her reading, is a process of
internalizing the will to power, which she takes to be a desire for power necessary
for the a rmation of life.251 This overcoming will result in our “imagining dif-
ferences we can make, setting goals, and working towards them. . . ”252 However,
this gloss on nihilism gives no sense of the depth or di culty of the problem. Its
accompanying reading of overcoming gives no hint as to the role of valuation or in-
terpretation. Moreover, her characterization of the later Nietzsche as an advocate
of common sense and science robs his thought of the revolutionary and creative
character necessary for his hoped-for cultural revival.
Clark’s attempt to defend Nietzsche against the problems associated with
Danto’s reading of his perspectivism is admirable. It is, however, plagued with
problems. Moreover, she often seems more interested in saving science and common
sense from Nietzsche than saving Nietzsche from Danto’s criticisms. The next
section will present a defense of Nietzsche of a di erent nature. Rather than
theories of truth and perception, this defense will focus on Nietzsche’s comments
regarding the nature of language.
NIETZSCHE ON LANGUAGE
Clark’s neo-Kantian defense of Nietzsche depended on a particular reading of his
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. According to this reading, he rejects
truth because he maintains a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. Against
this reading, I will argue that in this essay Nietzsche rejects a particular view of
language. The alternate view of language he develops there remains more or less
250Clark (1990), 232.
251Clark (1990), 232, 283.
252Clark (1990), 258.
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intact throughout the rest of his works. Further, this alternate view of language
provides a basis for a coherent account of overcoming as a process which results in
conceptual creation or revision.
Clark takes Nietzsche’s claim in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense
that truths are illusions to commit him to the claim that the beliefs and judgments
we take to be true are false. Against this reading, I suggest that in likening truths
to illusions Nietzsche means that language is not an instrument of science. When
we are engaged in scientific investigation, we think we are speaking about the
constituents of the world. In our everyday lives, we tend to think that when we
utter true sentences we are describing how things stand in the world. This is a
highly intuitive view. In likening truths to illusions, however, Nietzsche is asserting
that this is not the case.253 Our language, he says, “if not derived from never-never
land, is at least not derived from the essence of things.”254 We tend to think our
judgments and beliefs concern the nature of reality, but this gets the nature of
language wrong.
Rather than an instrument of science, Nietzsche suggests that language is
an instrument of power. Prior to the formation of society, in the war of all against
all, Nietzsche claims, individuals used language as a means for self-preservation.
It is by means of the “powers of dissimulation” manifested in language use that
weaker individuals can preserve themselves against physically stronger individu-
als.255 Within society, however, language becomes a means for the smooth oper-
ation and continued existence of the collective. With the inception of society, he
says, a system of reference and a set of truths is established.256 Being a member
253Nietzsche (1979), 82-83.
254Nietzsche (1979), 83.
255Nietzsche (1979), 80-81.
256Nietzsche (1979), 81.
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of the society requires using the same system of reference as everyone else. Use of
the common language becomes a duty and is enforced with moral sanction.257
We forget that language is an instrument of power rather than an instru-
ment of science. However, we can remind ourselves of the nature of language by
looking at a variety of languages. He says:
The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is
never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression;
otherwise, there would not be so many languages.258
Looking at many di erent languages and the di erent structures of their concepts,
we can see that language is not a means of describing the world. Language is
not a means of describing the relationships that obtain between things. Nietzsche
insists, rather, that language is a means of describing the “relations of things to
men” and “a sum of human relations.”259
The view of language as an instrument of science assumes that our concepts
reflect the the structure of the world. It assumes that our concepts correspond
to the constituents of reality and that the relationships that obtain between our
concepts reflect the relationships between the constituents of reality. But this, says
Nietzsche, mistakes the origin and nature of our concepts. He says:
We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is in-
dividual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and
no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which
remains inaccessible and indefinable for us. For even our contrast be-
tween individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does
not originate in the essence of things.260
257Nietzsche (1979), 84.
258Nietzsche (1979), 82.
259Clark (1990), 82, 84.
260Nietzsche (1979), 83.
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Our language is a body of concepts, but these concepts do not reflect the structure
of reality, assuming it has one. Rather, Nietzsche explains, our concepts are the
result of a multiplicity of metaphors. By “metaphor” he means “the equation
of unequal things.” In creating and employing concepts, he thinks, we equate
or assimilate things that are dissimilar and are even completely di erent kinds of
things such as nerve stimuli and images, images and sounds or words, and di erent
cases of each of these.261
Our mistake about the nature of language is a result, Nietzsche argues, of
forgetting something about our own nature. It is, Nietzsche says:
. . . only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of
images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human
imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun,
this window, this table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting
that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with
any repose and consistency.262
The appearance that the world has a stable and persisting structure is the result
of the concepts that we have created, rather than of the nature of the world itself.
In forwarding this view of language, Nietzsche ultimately is seeking to re-
mind us of our nature as artistically creating subjects. In arguing against the view
that language is an instrument of science, Nietzsche is reminding us of our role in
the creation and application of concepts. “The drive,” he says, “toward the forma-
tion of metaphors [concepts] is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot
for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with
man himself.”263 This reminder is meant to free us from our conceptual prison.
Speaking of our concepts, he says:
261Nietzsche (1979), 82-83.
262Nietzsche (1979), 86, Cf. 84.
263Nietzsche (1979), 88-89.
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That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy
man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing
but a sca olding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated
intellect. And when it [the liberated intellect] smashes this framework
to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an
ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest,
it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts. . . 264
The liberated intellect realizes the contingency of concepts and rather than being
imprisoned by them, plays with them and creates new ones.265 Concepts are our
own creation, but they imprison us when we forget this fact.266
The end of the essay suggests that Nietzsche’s aim in reminding us of our
nature as artistically creating subjects is to instigate a cultural revival. Nietzsche
introduces the intuitive man and the rational man.267 The rational man is the
scientific man, who attains the practical necessities of living through the guidance
of our concepts. The intuitive man, on the other hand, realizes the contingency
of our concepts and is guided instead by intuition. The life of the intuitive man
destroys the conceptual prison and renews the process of concept formation. Dif-
ferent ages, according to Nietzsche, are characterized by the dominance of either
the rational man or the intuitive man. Ages dominated by the intuitive man are
cultural ages characterized by art, beauty, and happiness.268
This reading of Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense gives
a very di erent impression than Clark’s reading. Instead of the topic of truth, this
reading takes Nietzsche to be primarily concerned with the nature of language.
A consequence of this view of language is that the metaphysical correspondence
264Nietzsche (1979), 90.
265Nietzsche (1979), 89-90.
266The reader should compare this with Wittgenstein’s idea of entanglement.
267Nietzsche (1979), 90.
268Nietzsche (1979), 90-91.
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theory of truth is incorrect. And Nietzsche is aware of this consequence. Part of
arguing against the view of language as an instrument of science requires unsettling
this highly intuitive view of truth. Contra Clark, however, Nietzsche’s primary aim
in this essay is to forward a view of language and reorient our understanding of
the relationship between ourselves, language, and the world and thereby instigate
a cultural revival.
In fairness to Clark, Nietzsche’s comments are at times incautious and he
does appear to take a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth as the standard.
Our beliefs, he says, are not about “the things themselves” and our language is
“not derived from the essence of things.”269 Regarding our ability to point out
objects corresponding to our concepts, Nietzsche says, “it is a truth of limited
value. . . a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point
which would be ‘true in itself’.”270 About the truth-seeker, he says, “He forgets that
the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things
themselves.”271 Such statements can easily be taken to assume a metaphysical
correspondence theory of truth as Clark believes.
Clark’s reading, however, ignores the overall aim of the essay which is to
encourage the individual to engage in concept creation. Despite occasional incau-
tious comments, Nietzsche is consistent in insisting that concepts are a human
creation that do not reflect the structure of the world. Nietzsche insists “nature
is acquainted with no forms and no concepts. . . 272 Developing the idea that each
people has its own conceptual system, Nietzsche says:
269Nietzsche (1979), 83.
270Nietzsche (1979), 85.
271Nietzsche (1979), 86.
272Nietzsche (1979), 83.
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Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction,
who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts
upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water.273
In the same vein, Nietzsche says regarding the laws and regularities identified by
science, “All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement
of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties
which we bring to things.”274 Our concepts reflect the creative power of humans
not the structure of the world. Nietzsche’s point, then, is that the view of language
as an instrument of science and its metaphysical correspondence view of truth is
incorrect. Instead of assuming such a theory, as Clark argues, Nietzsche is trying
to shake us of this standard.
Clark’s defense of Nietzsche, then, begins with a misinterpretation of his
views as presented in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. The reading
presented there depends not on a rejection of truth, as she and Danto suggest, but
rather on a particular view of the nature of language. Clark may, nonetheless, be
correct about Nietzsche’s later views. The later Nietzsche may be a neo-Kantian.
Clark points to his advocacy of science and common sense as evidence for this
neo-Kantianism. She even goes so far as to suggest that Nietzsche lauded science
and common sense for avoiding the metaphysical mistakes of philosophy.275 I
will suggest that this, again, gets Nietzsche wrong. Rather, the view of language
Nietzsche presents in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense remains more or
less intact throughout the rest of his work.
The later Nietzsche is highly critical of science. Moreover, his criticism of
science is the same as his criticism of philosophy. They both embody the ascetic
273Nietzsche (1979), 85.
274Nietzsche (1979), 88.
275Clark (1990), 108.
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will to truth.276 Against scientists’ insistence that their empirical rationality makes
them “free spirits,” Nietzsche insists scientists “are far from being free spirits: for
they still have faith in truth.”277 Indeed, the task of the scientist assumes the same
metaphysical foundations as that of the philosopher:
That which constrains these men [scientists], however, this uncondi-
tional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself . . . it is the faith
in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth, sanctioned and
guaranteed by this ideal alone.278
Far from neglecting the topic of truth after Beyond Good & Evil, as Clark claims,
Nietzsche here criticizes scientists for their faith in truth. Indeed, he suggests
that the death of God means we have to rethink the will to truth.279 Instead of
science, he believes we should look to art as an ideal and source of meaning.280
This parallels his encouragement of the intuitive man at the end of On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.
The later Nietzsche, then, is not uncritical of science. Far from it. However,
he does frequently insist that we trust the evidence of our senses. In one epigram
in Beyond Good & Evil Nietzsche writes, “All credibility, all good conscience, all
evidence of truth come only from the senses.”281 This positive assessment of the
senses is reprised in The Anti-Christ. Speaking of the Christian-Enlightenment
view of human nature, he says, “ ‘Pure spirit’ is pure stupidity: if we deduct the
nervous system and the senses, the ‘mortal frame’, we miscalculate—that’s all!”282
276Nietzsche (1992b), 539-552, 583-592.
277Nietzsche (1992b), 586.
278Nietzsche (1992b), 589.
279Nietzsche (1992b), 589.
280Nietzsche (1992b), 589-590. The astute reader might recognize the similarity here with
Wittgenstein’s thought circa the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
281Nietzsche (1992a), 278.
282Nietzsche (1968a), 125.
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Nietzsche’s advocacy of the senses might seem to indicate advocacy of common
sense and science. This may be what Clark is referring to when she insists he
advocates science.
However, Nietzsche’s exhortations of the senses are meant to bring to our
attention the varied, disorderly, changing nature of reality. Further, the textual
evidence suggests that this view is a constant throughout Nietzsche’s thought.
Speaking of the faith of philosophers in a “real” world in Twilight of the Idols, Ni-
etzsche says, “It is what we make of their [the senses’] evidence that first introduces
a lie into it, for example, the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of du-
ration. . . ‘Reason’ is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses.”283
We find similar comments in Beyond Good & Evil.284 Likewise, Nietzsche char-
acterizes Platonism as arising from “resistence to obvious sense evidence. . . the
motley whirl of the senses.”285 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he has Zarathustra re-
flect, “When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon, when gangway
and railings span the stream: truly he is not believed who says: ‘Everything is
in flux.’ ”286 Nietzsche’s profession of admiration for Heraclitus in Twilight of the
Idols is due to Heraclitus’ recognition of this flux.
The varied, disorderly, changing nature of reality is meant to show us the
inadequacy of any single conceptual system. This is particularly aimed against
Christian morality. The di culty facing any critique of Christianity, he observes,
283Nietzsche (1968b), 36, Cf. Nietzsche (1969), 235-236. Despite her claim that the falsification
thesis is absent from Nietzsche’s work post-Beyond Good & Evil, Clark actually refers to this
passage. She argues that the falsification here is confined to philosophers, as opposed to scientists
and the ordinary man and, thus, that this passage does not provide evidence against her neo-
Kantian reading. For an argument against this claim, the reader is directed to two paragraphs
above.
284Nietzsche (1992a), 235-237.
285Nietzsche (1992a), 212.
286Nietzsche (1969), 218.
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is that:
Out of this erroneous perspective on all things one makes a morality, a
virtue, a holiness for oneself, one unites the good conscience with seeing
falsely—one demands that no other perspective shall be accorded any
value after one has rendered one’s own sacrosanct with the names ‘God’,
‘redemption’, ‘eternity’.287
Christianity rejects any counter-evidence as illegitimate and inviable. Its putative
supernatural foundations are inaccessible to the senses and, thus, invulnerable
to any possible counter-evidence. This same problem is present in the putative
metaphysical foundations of philosophy and science. If we recognize our nature
as bodied beings, however, and turn our attention to the “motley whirl of the
senses,” Nietzsche hopes we will recognize the absurdity of the claim that any one
conceptual system equals ultimate truth. The relationship between the world and
our concepts, Nietzsche insists, isn’t like that.
Our conceptual systems are particular interpretations of the varied, disor-
derly, changing nature of reality. These interpretations impose form and order
upon reality. The activity of giving form and order is a manifestation of “will to
power,” which is, he believes, the fundamental drive of life.288 Nietzsche focuses on
the moral because he thinks this aspect of our cultural valuations is particularly
pernicious. There is, he has Zarathustra say in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “no greater
power on earth than good and evil.”289 However, it is clear that he believes our
other concepts are equally the result of human interpretations. On this subject,
he says:
287Nietzsche (1968a), 120. This is yet another post-Beyond Good & Evil passage in which
Clark’s falsification thesis appears.
288Cf. Nietzsche (1992a), 393, Nietzsche (1992b), 515.
289Nietzsche (1969), 84.
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It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, for-each-other, relativ-
ity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when
we project and mix this symbol world into things as it if existed ‘in
itself,’ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically.290
The concepts enumerated are from the sciences, mathematics, morality, and pol-
itics. These concepts form a system which we project upon the world, giving it
form, just as via our interpretations of our physio-psychological experience and
characteristics give form to ourselves. Our concepts, in Nietzschean terms, are a
manifestation of our will to power.
Overcoming, then, is the process of creating and applying concepts. Con-
sider the following passage in which Nietzsche discusses the Platonic origins of
Christian morality:
. . . the charm of the Platonic way of thinking, which was a noble way of
thinking, consisted precisely in resistance to obvious sense-evidence. . . and
by means of pale, cold, gray concept nets which they threw over the
motley whirl of the senses. . . In this overcoming of the world, and in-
terpreting the world in the manner of Plato, there was an enjoyment
di erent from that which the physicists o er us today. . . 291
We overcome the varied, disorderly, changing nature of reality by giving it form and
order through the application of concepts to it. Similarly, we overcome ourselves
by creating and applying concepts to the unorganized chaos of our instincts.
Nietzsche’s view of language provides a coherent, non-metaphorical account
of overcoming. Overcoming is the process of giving form and order to the variable,
disordered, changing nature of reality by creating and applying concepts. Self-
overcoming is this process applied to the chaos of our instincts. Additionally, this
view of language works to free the Nietzschean individual from the moral sanctions
290Nietzsche (1992a), 219.
291Nietzsche (1992a), 212.
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of modernity. The Nietzschean individual, realizing she is unconstrained by any
one interpretation, sees that she is able to revise, create, and apply concepts of her
own. She is able to revise the interpretation she was given and, thereby, to carry
out Nietzsche’s hoped-for cultural revival.
The Nietzschean individual provides a model for our individual caught in
a moment of culture crisis. Recall, the problem facing our individual is that the
world-picture of her culture no longer helps her make sense of the world in which
she finds herself. In particular, her idea of the good life is no longer practically
realizable. As such, it is no longer helpful in guiding her decisions and is, rather,
a source of delusion or disappointment. In order to avoid an unfulfilling fate,
she must find a way to escape or change her world-picture and the expectations
it gives her. That is, she must, like the Nietzschean individual, recognize her
creative nature and revise, create, and apply concepts of her own. The solution to
the problem of culture crisis, then, rests in the process of overcoming. The solution
lies in creating a new interpretation of ourselves and the world.
Against Clark’s neo-Kantian defense of Nietzsche, I suggested that Niet-
zsche embraces a particular view of language. I argued that Nietzsche rejects a
metaphysical correspondence theory of truth as a consequence of this view. His
alternate view of language gives a coherent and non-metaphorical account of the
process of overcoming. As such, this view of language is essential to Nietzsche’s
project, the Nietzschean individual, and the fate of our individual caught in a
moment of culture crisis.
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VITAMIN W
Though Nietzsche wrote extended passages on the nature of language and its re-
lationship to culture, he did not produce a full-fledged philosophy of language.
Indeed, though we can get a general sense of his view of language, his ideas remain
underdeveloped. Further, though he was an excellent culture critic, Nietzsche was
not a very careful philosopher of language. This carelessness has left him open
to criticism from more persnickety philosophers. But this view of the nature of
language is essential to a non-metaphorical understanding of overcoming.
Though Nietzsche leaves his view of language severely underdeveloped, we
can get a sense of his thoughts on the subject. The central insight of this view is
that we give order and form to ourselves and the world via the creation and ap-
plication of concepts. Nietzsche’s other insights are dependent upon this one. We
are creative animals because we create ourselves and the world via our conceptual
interpretations. There are no metaphysical or supernatural truths because these
assume an enduring source of truth prior and external to our interpretations. Niet-
zsche calls on the Nietzschean individual to resolve the problems of modernity by
engaging in overcoming and, thereby, carrying out a cultural revival. This solution
is only coherent given his view of language.
Though we can get a sense of Nietzsche’s thoughts about the nature of
language, the sketchiness of his views is problematic. Moreover, his blustering,
often incautious style is ill-suited to the delicate task of language philosophy. We
can see the results of such incaution in Clark’s response to Nietzsche’s view of
language as metaphor. Metaphor, she argues, requires a conceptual counterpart
and thus, not all language can be metaphor.292 Danto has a similar objection to
292Clark (1990), 69-77.
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Nietzsche’s creative or imaginative uses of concepts in art. Such imaginative uses,
he argues, must have ordinary counterparts.293 Such non-metaphorical or ordinary
uses of language or concepts, they insist, must be the correct use. These objections
misunderstand Nietzsche’s point.
Rather than leaving Nietzsche to his own devices on the topic of language,
I suggest we look to Wittgenstein for supplementary treatment on the subject.
Wittgenstein’s view on the nature of language shares Nietzsche’s central insight
that language is a system of concepts by which we give form and order to the world.
Moreover, Wittgenstein is much more careful than Nietzsche and gave the topic of
language a more comprehensive treatment. This allows us to flesh out Nietzsche’s
insights in Wittgensteinian terms. According to this suggestion, we should think
of Nietzsche’s view of language in terms of a Wittgensteinian language-game. In
Wittgensteinian terms, then, overcoming is a process of revising or creating the
world-picture and concepts of our language.
Wittgenstein can help us make sense of Nietzsche. But the favor goes
both ways. Whereas Nietzsche was not a particularly skilled language philosopher,
Wittgenstein was not a very good culture critic.294 The comparison with Nietzsche
gives a plausible explanation as to the connection vonWright says Wittgenstein saw
between his thought and “features of our culture or civilization.”295 The suggestion
is that Wittgenstein saw that his view of language is essential to understanding
culture and our world-picture as a human creation, subject to human revision
and creation. In articulating his view of language Wittgenstein hoped to show
us that the cultural problems from which he saw us su ering were within our
293Danto (2005), 26-28.
294Consider the complete absence of the notion of power in Wittgenstein. Cf. Sluga (2011),
128-129.
295von Wright (1998), 110.
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power to resolve. By articulating his view of language, he hoped to reorient our
understanding of the relationship between ourselves, language, and the world and,
thereby, show us the way out of the fly-bottle we have constructed for ourselves.296
The resonances between these two thinkers have not gone unnoticed. Erich
Heller first compared them in a 1966 essay. Heller argued that the intellectual
development of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein followed a similar arc. The thought of
both men, he says, is characterized by the rejection of metaphysics and “the loss of
faith in any pre-established correspondence between, on the one hand, the logic of
our thought and language, and, on the other hand, the ‘logic’ of Reality.”297 Heller
thinks the turn to language by both thinkers is a mistake which signals the end of
good, productive philosophy.298
Gordon Bearn develops a more optimistic version of this comparison in
his 1997 work Waking to Wonder in which he argues that linguistic meaning and
existential meaning are inextricably bound up with one another.299 Many other
commentators have compared Nietzsche and Wittgenstein in passing, including
von Wright, Pippin, Pitkin, Robinson, and Sluga.300
David Owen has developed this comparison in a di erent direction. Both
thinkers, he argues, help us understand the phenomenon of what he refers to
as “aspectival captivity.” Aspectival captivity is a kind of non-physical captivity
di erent in kind from ideological captivity.301 The aspect that holds us captive is
a particular picture or perspective of the world that we inherit pre-rationally and
296Wittgenstein (1967), §309.
297Heller (1976), 214.
298Heller (1976), 225-226.
299Cf. Sontag (1995) for a further exploration of the existential and mystical in Wittgenstein.
300von Wright (1998), 115, Pippin (2009), 45, 72, Pitkin (1972), 336, Robinson (2009), 29, 32,
48, 148, Sluga (2011), 15, 76, 82-86.
301Owen (2003), 84.
94
which underlies our judgments and beliefs.302 The problem of aspectival captivity
is that sometimes our picture or perspective stops being helpful.303 At times, he
says:
. . . given changes in the conditions of worldly activity, we may come
to experience our world picture or some aspect of it as problematic in
that we are increasingly unable to make sense of ourselves as agents
in this way. In other words, a disjuncture may emerge between our
ways of making sense of ourselves, on the one hand, and our cares and
commitments, on the other.304
When our picture or perspective no longer helps us in making sense of ourselves
and our lives, we need a way to “call [it] into question in order to assess its value.”305
As aspectival captivity concerns pre-rationally accepted pictures or per-
spectives of the world, it requires a di erent kind of critique from ideological
captivity. Owen refers to this kind of critique as “aspectival therapy” and ar-
gues that Wittgenstein’s perspicuous representation and Nietzsche’s genealogy are
two forms.306 These methods reorient “our relationship to our current ways of
thinking.”307 They put on display the problematic disjuncture between “our ways
of making sense of ourselves and our cares and commitments” and show us the
possibility of other pictures or perspectives.308
This comparison is helpful in understanding each thinker’s respective project.
Both thinkers were concerned with the state of culture in their respective eras. Ad-
ditionally, both saw that the tenacity of this cultural problem was due to a certain
302Owen (2003), 84, 89.
303Owen (2003), 89.
304Owen (2003), 84.
305Owen (2003), 85.
306Owen (2003), 82.
307Owen (2003), 87.
308Owen (2003), 86-87. Cf. Owen (2001), Owen (2002).
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misleading understanding of the relationship between ourselves, language, and the
world. Nietzsche employed his talent to articulate the problem of culture and iden-
tified overcoming as the solution. Wittgenstein employed his talent to explore the
nature of language and saw that something like his view of language was necessary
in order to make sense of this cultural problem and its solution.
This chapter was concerned with Nietzsche’s view of language. It was sug-
gested that this view of language is essential to giving a coherent, non-metaphorical
account of overcoming which is central to Nietzsche’s project. Given this non-
metaphorical account of overcoming, the Nietzschean individual provides a model
for our individual caught in a moment of culture crisis. As this view of language
is importantly similar to Wittgenstein’s, it was suggested that we think of Niet-
zsche’s insights in Wittgensteinian terms. Moreover, this comparison provides a
highly plausible explanation as to the connection Wittgenstein saw between his
views and the human condition.
However, some commentators argue that Wittgenstein’s view of language
renders the individual incapable of concept revision, creation, and application.
Thus, the appeal to a Wittgensteinian view of language may preclude the Niet-
zschean individual. That is, Wittgenstein may simply give us reason to be dissat-
isfied with our beliefs and judgments, via his perspicuous representation, without
giving us a way to change them. This would leave our individual caught in a mo-
ment of culture crisis in the lurch, if you will. The next chapter will consider the
relationship between the individual and language in Wittgenstein’s thought.
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WITTGENSTEIN ON TALKING TO YOURSELF
The resonances between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thought have not gone
completely unnoticed. Nonetheless, the assertion that there are important similar-
ities and sympathies between these thinkers is often met with incredulity. Bearn
noted such a response in his 1997 Waking to Wonder despite the fact that his
work elaborated on Heller’s work which first appeared over thirty years prior.309
Such incredulity has also characterized this author’s own experience. The source
of this incredulity is likely due to significant dissonances in interpretation. As we
saw in the second chapter, commentators have often taken Wittgenstein’s work
on the nature of language to have conservative implications. On the other hand,
Nietzsche is often taken to be highly radical.
The suggestion of the previous chapter is that the di erences between Ni-
etzsche and Wittgenstein are not so significant. While they focused on di erent
aspects, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are concerned with the same problem. They
are concerned with the phenomenon of cultural decline, its sources, symptoms, and
solution. Both thinkers appeal to the individual, trying to shake her free of the
picture or perspective that holds her captive. Nietzsche calls upon the Nietzschean
individual to carry out a cultural revival. Wittgenstein explores the nature of lan-
guage showing that such a project is even coherent. This chapter will consider
the challenge that an appeal to a Wittgensteinian view of language precludes the
Nietzschean individual.
309Bearn (1997), 79.
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ANTI-INDIVIDUALIST READINGS
I argued in the third chapter that the Nietzschean individual is only possible if the
notion of overcoming is coherent. I suggested in the fourth chapter that the notion
of overcoming is dependent on Nietzsche’s view of language. This view of language
shares its key insight with Wittgenstein’s view of language. As such, I suggested
that we can look to Wittgenstein’s view of language to flesh out Nietzsche’s views.
However, several commentators have interpreted Wittgenstein as forwarding a col-
lectivist or communitarian account of meaning. If these commentators are correct,
this view of language will only serve to preclude the Nietzschean individual. This
section will provide an examination of the relevant commentary.
It will be helpful to introduce two characters. Crusoe and life-long Crusoe
are recurring characters in the debate as to whether Wittgenstein’s view of lan-
guage is individualist or anti-individualist. “Crusoe” is a character borrowed from
Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel who became stranded on an island as an adult.
For our purposes, the importance of Crusoe is that he is a physically isolated,
competent speaker of his native language. He engages in one- and two-person
language-games, playing both roles where necessary. He is important insofar as his
conceptual possibility undercuts the idea that meaningful use of language requires
a physically present linguistic community. “Life-long Crusoe” is a twist on the
Crusoe character who is physically and socially isolated and a competent speaker
of some language of his own invention. He is important insofar as his concep-
tual possibility undercuts the idea that language is essentially social insofar as the
existence of language requires a linguistic community.
The debate centered on these characters does not directly speak to our
concern for the Nietzschean individual. The Nietzschean individual is neither a
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Crusoe nor life-long Crusoe. She does not, like Crusoe, simply continue to use
language as it was given her. She creates new concepts and new language-games.
Unlike the life-long Crusoe, the Nietzschean individual is taught a language in the
normal way. Each of the following readings of Wittgenstein will have to be assessed
individually as to their verdict on each of these characters. Some fairly interesting
combinations are in evidence.
As we saw in the second chapter, Georg von Wright notes that Wittgenstein
saw a connection between his thought and the human condition. It is clear, says
von Wright, that Wittgenstein saw a connection between “features of our culture
and civilization” and language-games.310 According to von Wright’s Wittgenstein,
problems in our culture or civilization manifest as “a distortion or malfunction of
the language-games.”311 The problems of philosophy are symptoms of problems
in our culture.312 Resolution of these distortions or malfunctions will involve res-
olution of a corresponding problem with the way we live.313 Von Wright insists,
however, that while Wittgenstein saw a connection between his thought and the
human condition, he “certainly did not think this [the resolution of such cultural
problems was] possible through the e orts of an individual.”314
The conclusion that the individual is powerless to address our cultural prob-
lems follows from von Wright’s communitarian interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
view of language. According to Wittgenstein, he says, the individual is “deeply
entrenched in basic structures of a social nature.”315 That is, the individual’s
world-picture, which is the background of her beliefs and judgments, is given to
310von Wright (1998), 110.
311von Wright (1998), 111.
312von Wright (1998), 112.
313von Wright (1998), 111.
314von Wright (1998), 113.
315von Wright (1998), 111.
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her by society. Von Wright says, for Wittgenstein “the individual’s beliefs, judg-
ments, and thought are entrenched in unquestionably accepted language-games
and socially sanctioned forms of life.”316 This unquestioning acceptance forms the
basis of meaningful language. The attempt to take a critical stance towards our
language-games and forms of life would undermine the individual’s very ability
to make judgments, form beliefs, or perform actions. On von Wright’s reading,
Wittgenstein’s view of language precludes life-long Crusoe and the Nietzschean
individual.
Perhaps the most famous collectivist reading of Wittgenstein is Kripke’s as
presented in his 1982Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. This collectivist
reading turns on an interpretation of the private language argument. Kripke takes
the private language argument to be concerned with the problem of following a
rule.317 Kripke glosses Wittgenstein’s claim that rules fix meaning to mean that
meaning is fixed by consistent usage of a word through time.318 The problem,
Kripke argues, is that there is no fact about the individual that determines that
her present usage conforms to her previous usage.319 According to this reading, the
individual’s “finite mind” is not capable of establishing meaning.320 To resolve this
problem, which Kripke characterizes as a kind of scepticism regarding meaning, we
must turn to collectively determined assertability conditions.321 It is only because
316von Wright (1998), 118.
317Kripke (1982), vii, 2-3, 45. Kripke thinks rule-following must be the focus of the private
language argument because the ability of an individual to identify her own sensations seems ob-
viously unproblematic to him. “How can,” Kripke asks, “I possibly have any di culty identifying
my own sensations? And if there were a di culty, how could ‘public’ criteria help me?” Kripke
(1982), 62 This is a puzzling gloss of the argument that reappears fairly frequently. Cf. Pears
(1988), 328, Rundle (2009), 138, 151, Sluga (2011), 73.
318Kripke (1982), 40.
319Cf. Kripke (1982), 11-14.
320Kripke (1982), 21, 54, 69, 89.
321Kripke (1982), 74, 79.
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we “generally agree” about the meaning of a word that language is possible at
all.322 Without “reference to a community,” Kripke maintains, words cannot have
any determinate meaning.323 This reading excludes Crusoe, life-long Crusoe, and
the Nietzschean individual.
David Bloor develops Kripke’s collectivist reading. Like Kripke, the idea
of rule-following serves as the crux of Bloor’s collectivist reading. On a Wittgen-
steinian view of language, for a word to be meaningful there must be “a real
di erence between its being applied correctly and its being applied in correctly.”324
As such, Bloor claims, meaning is intimately connected with the notion of rule-
following, or the normativity of rules. If we look to how we learn rules, as
Wittgenstein suggests, a collectivist view of language emerges.325 Bloor argues
that Wittgenstein forwarded a finitist theory of meaning according to which we
create and expand meaning every time we apply the rule to a new case.326 In ap-
plying rules to new cases we are guided by “our instinctive (but socially educated)
sense of ‘sameness’.”327 Our words are meaningful, then, because collective consen-
sus guides our application of rules and, thereby, provides the normativity needed
for rule-following.328 The individual, as the private language argument suggests,
cannot create this normativity for herself.329 It isn’t clear that Bloor’s view ex-
cludes Crusoe, but his collectivist view of meaning precludes life-long Crusoe and
the Nietzschean individual.
Norman Malcolm continues the theme of community agreement. Malcolm
322Kripke (1982), 97.
323Kripke (1982), 79, Cf. Kripke (1982), 88, 89.
324Bloor (2004), 117.
325Bloor (1983), 9.
326Bloor (1983), 9-19, 136.
327Bloor (1983), 17.
328Bloor (1983), 17.
329Bloor (1983), 55, 69, Cf. Bloor (2004), 117, 118.
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rejects Kripke’s characterization of Wittgenstein as a sceptic regarding meaning,
but his argument is similar to Bloor’s in that he argues that the concept of rule-
following requires a community.330 A rule, on Malcolm’s reading, is a communal
practice, custom, or institution.331 In order to follow a rule, there must be agree-
ment as to what a rule means and requires.332 Such agreement is necessary, says
Malcolm, for the existence of language at all:
. . .Wittgenstein is saying, clearly enough, that without general agree-
ment as to what is ‘the same’, as to whether going on thus fits this
rule—there would not be rules, descriptions, or language, but at most
‘a confusion of tongues’.333
This is very similar to Bloor’s argument from meaning finitism. The individual’s
finite mind, intentions, and actions are not su cient to establish a rule. Rather,
general agreement is required. This agreement, Malcolm argues, is “exhibited in
uniformity of behavior,” that is, in many people taking part in the same form of
life.334 The socially determined rule fixes the ordinary use of a word and thereby
constitutes the standard of correct use.335
Malcolm’s gloss on the private language argument follows from this commu-
nitarian reading of Wittgenstein’s view of language. General agreement is required
for meaning. Malcolm argues that because the objects of the private language are
essentially private there can be no general consensus as to the application of the
names of the private language. Without this basis for distinguishing between
correct and incorrect application of a rule, there can be no meaningful private
330Malcolm (1988), 154-155, Malcolm (1989), 6.
331Malcolm (1988), 156.
332Malcolm (1989), 13.
333Malcolm (1989), 10.
334Malcolm (1989), 13, 22, 25.
335Cf. Malcolm (1981).
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language.336 Malcolm finds the possibility of a Crusoe obvious and uninteresting,
but his communitarian reading leads him to reject the life-long Crusoe.337 This
communitarian reading precludes the Nietzschean individual as well.
John Canfield forwards a view similar to Malcolm’s. Like Malcolm, Can-
field takes rule-following to require a community.338 He takes it to be the case that
a linguistic community consists of at least two speakers and is characterized by
two-person language-games. This view takes for granted that communication is
the function of language.339 However, Canfield argues that Wittgenstein takes lan-
guage to be a family resemblance concept. Thus, while two-person language-games
are our paradigmatic example of language, he believes that Wittgenstein allows
for a language characterized by one-person language-games, such as Wittgenstein’s
monologuists.340 Canfield argues that, as things stand, our concept of language
is able to be analogically extended to these non-paradigmatic cases.341 However,
such analogical extension is not possible in the case of putative private languages.342
Private language, Canfield says, is too di erent from other cases of language for the
336Malcolm (1988), 158-159.
337Malcolm (1988), 5, 25.
338Canfield (1996), 470.
339Canfield (1996), 474-477.
340Canfield (1996), 478. Canfield introduces “Simple Crusoe” and “Sophisticated Crusoe” to
mediate between Malcolm and Hacker and Baker, who introduce an individualist reading of
Wittgenstein which we will see later. The Simple Crusoe “masters” only one-person language-
games but may have the ability to learn two-person language-games. The Sophisticated Crusoe
“masters” both one-person and some two-person language-games. Canfield (1996), 480. It’s
not clear, however, that these characters line up with the Crusoe and life-long Crusoe we met
earlier. Both of his Crusoes seem to be socially and physically isolated from the start and the
question appears to be whether they can develop language as communication with others, taking
for granted that they will be able to play language-games with themselves. The debate Canfield
sees, then, is very di erent from the debate in which other commentators are engaged.
341Canfield (1996), 478, 480-481, 484, 485.
342Canfield (1996), 485, 486.
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concept to apply.343 Despite his collectivist reading, Canfield’s view can accommo-
date Crusoe, life-long Crusoe, and the Nietzschean individual given an analogical
extension of our concept of language.
Stewart Candlish provides a di erent kind of reading of the private language
argument. Candlish argues that the private language argument has the form of
a reductio.344 The crux of the argument is the notion of private ostensive defini-
tion.345 The private linguist takes it to be the case that the individual can assign
meaning to a sensation word by fixing her attention upon a sensation and uttering
a word. The problem, Candlish argues, is that this account makes no distinction
between meaning and naming. It treats the thing named as the meaning of the
word. But this means that we can only correctly use this sensation word in the
presence of the named sensation.346 That is, private ostensive definition is insu -
cient to establish a rule for using the word and is, therefore, insu cient to establish
meaning.347 What we need to secure meaning, says Candlish, is to turn to some
publically accessible phenomenon.348 However, while Candlish argues that private
ostensive definition is insu cient to establish meaning, he does not follow Kripke,
Bloor, and Malcolm in concluding that meaning requires a community of speakers.
Candlish’s reading of the private language argument, then, leaves the question of
343Canfield (1996), 486.
344Candlish (1980), 87.
345Candlish (1980), 87-88, 91.
346Candlish (1980), 90.
347Candlish (1980), 91.
348Candlish (1980), 92, Cf. Pears (1988). Pears o ers a weaker version of this reading according
to which public objects and other speakers act as external constants that we look to as “checks”
on our usage rather than necessary elements of language. Pears (1988), 368. Additionally,
rather than taking private language to be incoherent, Pears takes Wittgenstein to argue that our
ability to create and maintain a sensation language depends on our first having a physical object
language. Pears (1988), 357. However, Pears attributes an unarticulated premise to Wittgenstein
which assumes an Augustinian view of language and indicates that Pears missed the point. Pears
(1988), 414.
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Crusoe, life-long Crusoe, and the Nietzschean individual untouched.
Peter Hacker and Gordon Baker forward an individualist reading of the
private language argument. They agree with Candlish that the private language
argument rests on the incoherence of private ostensive definition.349 However,
Hacker and Baker go on to make explicit that they do not believe this implies that
meaning requires a community of speakers. What the private language argument
shows, they argue, is that the rules of a language must be shareable.350 But,
contra Kripke, Bloor and Malcolm, this does not mean that a language must be
shared.351 Hacker and Baker reject the claim that communal agreement as to
what the rule means and requires is needed. Following a rule, Hacker and Baker
explain, is simply a regularity of behavior—a practice; part of a way of life.352
Such practices require only a “multiplicity of occasions” rather than a “multiplicity
of agents,” as the collectivist and communitarian readings hold.353 What a rule
means and requires is determined by the rule itself.354 The individual, Hacker and
Baker insist, can perfectly well use concepts and even a whole language of her own
innovation.355 On Hacker’s and Baker’s view, Crusoe, life-long Crusoe, and the
Nietzschean individual are all unquestionably conceptually possible.
My concern for the Nietzschean individual predisposes me to favor an indi-
vidualist reading like Hacker’s and Baker’s. Nonetheless, I am sympathetic when
Malcolm says he is “dissatisfied. . . with the lack of importance they [Hacker and
349Baker and Hacker (1984), 14, 23. Cf. Baker and Hacker (1990), 179, Hacker (2010), 100.
350Baker and Hacker (1990), 168.
351Baker and Hacker (1990), 171.
352Hacker (2010), 93-96, Baker and Hacker (1984), 53.
353Hacker (2010), 97.
354Baker and Hacker (1984), 72. Baker and Hacker argue that the communitarian and col-
lectivist readings of the private language argument assume that we need an external standard
to provide a basis for something like objective truth. They suggest that this just assumes an
Augustinian view of language. Baker and Hacker (1984), 75, 95, 116, 119.
355Hacker (2010), 105, 108-109, Baker and Hacker (1990), 172.
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Baker] assign to the presence of a community. . . ”356 Hacker goes so far as to dis-
miss the idea of “form of life” as wholly unimportant to Wittgenstein’s thought.357
But the dispute between Malcolm and Hacker and Baker assumes that the choice
is between a communitarian or an individualist reading. That is, they assume that
either the individual is inescapably embedded in an essentially social language or
that the community plays no important role and the individual is free to do what-
ever she wants, linguistically speaking. Neither of these positions seems to me to
capture the relationship Wittgenstein sees between the individual, community, and
language.
As the above survey suggests, the possibility of the Nietzschean individ-
ual depends upon whether language on Wittgenstein’s view is essentially social.
As evidence, collectivist and communitarian commentators point to rules and the
private language argument. The next section will provide an alternate reading of
these aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought. Against collectivist and communitarian
readings, it will be argued that something like Hacker’s and Baker’s view is cor-
rect. However, it will also be argued against Hacker and Baker that Wittgenstein
believed that the linguistic community plays an important role with regard to lan-
guage and the individual. The following reading, thereby, aims to transcend the
communitarian-individualist debate.
RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE
Anti-individualist readings of Wittgenstein take his investigation of rules and pri-
vate language as evidence that language is essentially social. They argue that rules
356Malcolm (1989), 5.
357From conversation.
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require collective agreement or a community of speakers. As meaning is fixed by
rules, meaning is impossible without a linguistic community. They point to the
private language argument as further evidence. The individual, they argue, is like
Wittgenstein’s diarist. Her actions are insu cient to establish meaning, just as
the diarist’s actions are insu cient to establish meaning for her sensation words.
Therefore, they conclude, language is essentially social. In this section I will argue
that anti-individualist readings misunderstand Wittgenstein on rules and private
language.
In the Preface to his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein o ers some
disparaging comments regarding the work. “I should have liked,” he says, “to
produce a good book. This has not come about, but the time is past in which I
could improve it.”358 Despite his own hesitancies, the first half of the first part
of the Philosophical Investigations represents a clear and concerted attack on the
Augustinian view of language and a development of his own alternative view.359
Wittgenstein presents the Augustinian view in the first remark quoting
Augustine’s description of his experience learning language:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved
towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called
by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their
intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural
language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes,
the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which
expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding
something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper
places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what ob-
jects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these
358Wittgenstein (1967), x.
359I say the first half of the first part because it seems to me that Wittgenstein’s argument
loses some of its clarity after the private language argument, not because he stops attacking the
Augustianian view.
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signs, I used them to express my own desires. 360
This description takes for granted a particular view of the nature of language. It
assumes that the world is divided into various kinds of objects and that words are
like names. Sentences assert propositions about states of a airs and are true or
false insofar as they correctly represent these. It assumes that we learn language
via ostensive definition whereby an object is indicated and a word is uttered.
Further, it assumes that understanding meaning is a mental process of getting the
connection between words and their referents correct.361
Wittgenstein’s alternate language-game picture of the nature of language
brings the question of rules to the forefront. Against the Augustinian view, he
argues, the meaning of a word is not the object to which it refers. Rather, the
meaning of a word is fixed by its role in the language-game. That is, the meaning
of a word is determined by the rules that govern the various things we do with it.
The meaning of a word is fixed by the rules for its use.
However, these rules are not like the axioms of a calculus. The various uses
of a word are not all determined beforehand by the rule.362 The rule is indefinite.
But the indefinite nature of rules, Wittgenstein argues, does not mean that the
meaning of the word is indeterminate.363 To bring out this point, Wittgenstein
likens indefinite rules to infinite series. The members of a series cannot all be given
beforehand precisely because there are an infinite number of them. However, if we
understand the function, then given any particular input we can give the correct
output.364 Similarly, an indefinite rule, despite being indefinite, is able to fix
360Wittgenstein (1967), 2 fn.
361The perceptive reader will be reminded of Russell’s view of language.
362Wittgenstein (1958), 25, Wittgenstein (1967), §§97-107.
363Wittgenstein (1967), §§68-71, §§79-88.
364Wittgenstein (1967), §§148-155, §§179-197.
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meaning in normal circumstances.365
The indefinite nature of these rules opens Wittgenstein to a Kripkean objec-
tion. If the application of the rule, says the objector, is not determined beforehand,
then the rule is open to an infinite number of interpretations. But this just means
that the rule which is meant to fix the meaning of the word doesn’t fix anything
at all.366 Wittgenstein summarizes this objection when he says:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a
rule because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with
the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there
could be neither accord nor conflict here.367
Wittgenstein suggests, however, that this objection shows that a mistake has been
made. There must, he says, be a “way of grasping a rule which is not an interpre-
tation.”368 Understanding a word is not a matter of interpreting a rule, but rather
of “obeying the rule.”369 That is, understanding a word is not a mental process,
but a practice, an activity, a way of behaving.370
At the time of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein has some trou-
ble explaining the idea of acting in accordance with a rule without interpretation.
He likens rules to orders and says that we are trained to obey them. We react in
particular ways.371 He says:
If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock, and my
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I
365Wittgenstein (1967), §142.
366Wittgenstein (1967), §198.
367Wittgenstein (1967), §201.
368Wittgenstein (1967), §201.
369Wittgenstein (1967), §201.
370Wittgenstein (1967), §202.
371Wittgenstein (1967), §206.
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do.”372
Similarly, after suggesting we think of rules as symbolic formulas, Wittgenstein
explains:
—I should have said: This is how it strikes me.
When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
I obey the rule blindly.373
Further on, Wittgenstein says:
“But surely you can see. . . ?” That is just the characteristic expression
of someone who is under the compulsion of a rule.374
Against anti-individualist readings, rules do not need to be interpreted. Rather,
the rule itself tells us what it requires. When we learn a rule we learn a certain
way of seeing and doing.
Wittgenstein has trouble explaining what he means here. However, it is
clear from the text that he means something like the idea of a world-picture which
he introduces later in On Certainty. Consider the following passage:
Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the ques-
tion whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don’t come to
blows about it, for example. That is part of the framework on which
the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descrip-
tions).375
Like our world-picture, these rules shape the unquestioned background against
which we form beliefs and make judgments. In learning rules we adopt a particular
world-picture that shapes how we see the world and, thereby, how we act in it.
372Wittgenstein (1967), §217.
373Wittgenstein (1967), §219.
374Wittgenstein (1967), §231.
375Wittgenstein (1967), §240.
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Though our use of words is guided by these rules, applying rules does not
require interpretation. Wittgenstein re-articulates this in On Certainty when he
says, “But the most important thing is: the rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking.
We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough.”376 Rules form the frame-
work that underlies our language, the world-picture that forms the background of
our judgments and beliefs. The bare fact that meaning is fixed by rules, then, does
not require collective agreement or a community of speakers to interpret the rules
for individuals. By shaping our world-picture, the rules themselves tell us what is
required.
Against the anti-individualists, then, rules do not require a collective or
community to interpret them. As Hacker and Baker note, the agreement necessary
is between cases, not between speakers. However, this does not mean the collective
or community plays no role in language nor that it is only agreement between cases
that matters for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein says:
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agree-
ment not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in
judgments.377
This is a conditional statement. Insofar as language is a means of communication,
we must agree about definitions and judgments. This, again, is a foreshadowing of
the notion of a world-picture that Wittgenstein introduces in On Certainty. The
idea is simply that communication requires that we share a world-picture. In order
to communicate we must operate with common background judgments and beliefs.
376Wittgenstein (1969), 46, Cf. 44, 47.
377Wittgenstein (1967), §242.
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Communication is a highly important function of language. However, con-
tra Canfield, communication is not the essential function of language. Wittgen-
stein’s monologuists example makes this clear:
A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame
and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We
could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who
accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.—An explorer
who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translat-
ing their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these
people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions
and decisions.)378
Communication, on Wittgenstein’s view, requires that we have a common world-
picture. But language is not essentially communicative. Not only do individuals
use language by themselves, but we can imagine a group of individuals who have
only ever spoken to themselves.
The monologuists example tells against anti-individualist readings in an-
other way. Some anti-individualist commentators take the fact that we learn lan-
guage via social processes to indicate that language is essentially social. Bloor,
for instance, takes Wittgenstein’s exhortations that we look to how we learn lan-
guage to lead to his collectivist conclusion.379 Malcolm complains that Hacker’s
and Baker’s individualistic reading requires that “(miraculously) they [the mono-
loguists] developed the same language.”380 This seems miraculous because they
did not learn their language from other speakers whereas we do. However, the
question of how language is learned is clearly not relevant in the monologuists ex-
ample. By forwarding this example, Wittgenstein is insisting that the conceptual
378Wittgenstein (1967), §243, cf. §491.
379Bloor (1983), 9.
380Malcolm (1989), 19.
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requirements of language do not preclude this possibility. The fact that we do
learn language via social processes does not make social learning a conceptually
necessary feature of language.
Anti-individualist commentators are likely to object that I cannot make
sense of the private language argument. As we saw above, these commentators take
the private language argument to show that the individual is incapable of fixing
meaning alone. However, if we compare the monologuists with the private linguist,
a di erent aim emerges. Recall, the monologuists “accompanied their activities by
talking to themselves.”381 On the other hand, in the case of the private linguist,
Wittgenstein asks us to suppose that he does not “have any natural expression for
the sensation,” such as crying is a natural expression of pain.382 The private linguist
is supposed to create a private language by noting his sensations and associating
words with them, keeping records as to which words he used in a diary.383 These
sensations are completely dissociated with any activity. The central question of the
private language argument, then, is whether there can be a language completely
dissociated from activity.384
Let’s examine the case. The diarist goes through the procedure of private
ostensive definition. He focuses his attention on a sensation and utters a word. He
is thereby supposed to have given a definition of a sensation word. Wittgenstein
objects:
—But “I impresss it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it
381Wittgenstein (1967), §243.
382Wittgenstein (1967), §256.
383Wittgenstein (1967), §258.
384Interestingly, Malcolm takes the private language argument to be centered on the “private
activity” of the private linguist. He seems to mean this as opposed to “communal activity.”
However, this misses the di erence between the monologuists and the private linguist. Malcolm
(1988), 156-158.
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about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the
present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say:
whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means
here that we can’t talk about “right”.385
The objection is that private ostension is not su cient for creating a rule or tech-
nique for using a word. However, the source of the insu ciency is not the absence
of a linguistic community, but rather the absence of criteria. The act of private
ostension is not su cient to provide a “criterion of correctness” because, by sup-
position, there is no activity to play the role of criteria.386 There is no activity to
fix the meaning to his words.387
This reading finds support in an elaboration on the topic of criteria a little
further on. Wittgenstein says:
Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man’s behaviour for
the fact that he does not understand a word: that it means nothing to
him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his “thinking he
understands”, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right
one. And, lastly, criteria for his undersanding the word right. In the
second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds
which no one else understands but which I “appear to understand”
might be called a “private language”.388
The criteria for whether a person understands a word is exhibited in his behavior or
activity. A person understands a word correctly when he acts in a particular way.
According to the parameters of private language, however, there is no behavior or
activity to serve as criteria. As such, there is no basis for making a distinction
385Wittgenstein (1967), §258.
386Cf. Wittgenstein (1967), §580.
387In the Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein o ers a di erent but related objection. Cf.
Wittgenstein (1958), 73-74, 172.
388Wittgenstein (1967), §269.
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between understanding or not understanding private language. Such a language is
no language at all.
As anti-individualist commentators have noted, there is an important con-
nection betweenWittgenstein’s investigation of rules and private language. Wittgen-
stein makes this connection in the course of his investigation of rules:
And hence also “obeying a rule” is a practice. And to think one is
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a
rule “privately”: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it.389
Kripke and Malcolm have pointed to this passage as indicating that an individ-
ual’s action cannot fix the meaning of a word.390 However, this anti-individualist
reading requires particular interpretations of the words “practice” and “privately”
that are not supported by the text. They read “practice” as “communal practice,”
whereas Wittgenstein’s investigation of obeying a rule and the monologuists ex-
ample shows that practice need not be communal. Further, they read “privately”
as “individual,” whereas the private linguist example shows that private does not
mean individual, but rather dissociated from any behavior or activity.
The suggested alternate reading supports a coherent interpretation of the
role of rules and private language in the broader argument of Philosophical Investi-
gations. As we saw above, Wittgenstein’s language-game picture alternative to the
Augustinian view of language brings the concept of rules to the fore. Wittgenstein
connects the discussion of rules and private language with a paradox. The paradox,
he says, is “no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course
of action can be made out to accord with the rule.”391 The paradox results if we
389Wittgenstein (1967), §202.
390Kripke (1982), 55, Malcolm (1988), 156.
391Wittgenstein (1967), §201.
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assume that the rules which fix the meaning of our words require interpretation.
Wittgenstein argues, instead, that while these rules guide our use of rules, we do
not interpret them. They shape our world-picture and, thereby, how we see and
act in the world. We are guided by rules insofar as they form the background of
our judgments and beliefs.
The private language argument removes the final recourse for those who
think we must interpret rules. Such thinkers, like Augustine, take it to be the
case that learning language is learning how to translate our inner thoughts and
experiences into the public language. They assume that we each have our own
private language, completely dissociated from activity and understandable only to
the individual. “The paradox,” Wittgenstein says, “disappears only if we make
a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always
serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts.”392 The private language argument is
meant to show that the assumption underlying this view of language is a nonstarter.
A private language is no language at all.
The suggestion of this reading of Wittgenstein on rules and private language
is that activity is essential to meaning. Our rules have a determinate meaning
because they shape our world-picture and, thereby, how we see and act in the
world. The private language argument suggests that it is only insofar as our words
are accompanied by activity that our words can have any meaning at all. In
addition to being supported by particular passages in the text, this reading fits in
with Wittgenstein’s overall project in Philosophical Investigations. In introducing
the term “language-game” Wittgenstein says, “the term ‘language-game’ is meant
to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity,
392Wittgenstein (1967), §304.
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or a form of life.”393 What makes language meaningful is its relationship to how
we live.
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NIETZSCHEAN INDIVIDUAL
The previous section provided an argument against anti-individualist readings of
Wittgenstein on language. The foregoing reading of Wittgenstein on rules and
private language favors Hacker’s and Baker’s reading of practices as regularities in
behavior. According to this reading, only regularities of behavior—not collective
or communal behavior or agreement—are conceptually required for language. This
individualist reading, however, fails to account for the important role the linguistic
community plays with regard to the individual.
It is important to note that regularities in behavior are all that is concep-
tually required for language. Practically speaking, the picture is quite di erent.
While communication may not be the essential function of language, conceptually
speaking, communication is a highly important function of language, practically
speaking. This fact has important implications for Wittgenstein. One of the
underlying suggestions of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is that our
shared language leads us to systematic confusions. Indeed, Wittgenstein says in a
1931 comment “Language sets everyone the same traps.”394 Wittgenstein focuses
in particular on the traps in which analytic philosophers get stuck.
Though few miss Wittgenstein’s interest in philosophical method, the im-
plications of his thought for the individual are often overlooked. However, there are
indications that he did not intend for these insights to be restricted to philosophers.
393Wittgenstein (1967), §23. Cf. “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—
forms of life.” Wittgenstein (1967), xi.
394Wittgenstein (1977), 18.
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In the Philosophical Investigations, he observes:
The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of lan-
guage have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their
roots are as deep in us as the form of our language and their significance
is as great as the importance of our language.395
These disquietudes are a feature of our common language. As such, they a ect
all speakers of that language. Thus, while his view of language has important
implications for philosophers and the philosophical method, this is not the full
extent of the ramifications of his philosophy. These insights also have implications
for seemingly inevitable and irresolvable problems in the lay individual’s life.
Indeed, comments not included in the Philosophical Investigations show
Wittgenstein calling for something like the Nietzschean individual. Two such com-
ments from 1937 show Wittgenstein concerned with a kind of culture crisis:
. . . young people today can be said to be in a situation where ordi-
nary common sense no longer su ces to meet the strange demands life
makes. Everything has become so intricate that mastering it would
require an exceptional intellect. Because skill at playing the game is
no longer enough; the question that keeps coming up is: can this game
be played at all now and what would be the right game to play?396
Here we see Wittgenstein applying the idea of games to the question of life in
the early twentieth century. He suggests that the “game” of ordinary common
sense may no longer be su cient for the world in which people find themselves.
The world has changed. It has become more complicated. As such, the game—the
language-game—we share is no longer adequate to serve the needs of the individual.
Wittgenstein continues this topic with another comment from the same
time period. He says:
395Wittgenstein (1967), 111.
396Wittgenstein (1977), 27e.
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The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that
will make what is problematic disappear.
The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does
not fit into life’s mould. So you must change the way you live and, once
your life does fit into the mould, what is problematic will disappear.397
The game of ordinary common sense is insu cient for life in the early twenti-
eth century. Thus, the individual finds her life to be problematic. Wittgenstein
suggests, just as we can resolve the problems of philosophy by doing philosophy
di erently, we can resolve the problems of life by living di erently.
This theme reappears in 1946. In one such comment, Wittgenstein says:
If life becomes hard to bear we think of a change in our circumstances.
But the most important and e ective change, a change in our own
attitude, hardly ever occurs to us. And the resolution to take such a
step is very di cult.398
The translation makes this sound like something out of a self-help book. Here,
the German word “Verhalten” has been translated as “attitude,” but it can also
be translated as “behavior.” This alternate translation is supported by a 1947
comment in which Wittgenstein likens a “Verhalten” to an “Art des Lebens” or
a form of life.399 If life becomes hard or problematic, Wittgenstein advises the
individual to change her behavior or how she lives. The world-picture inherent in
the shared language and form of life of her community is not su cient to make
sense of her life. She must, Wittgenstein says, find the strength to live in a di erent
way.400
397Wittgenstein (1977), 27e.
398Wittgenstein (1977), 53e.
399Wittgenstein (1977), 61.
400Cf. “Working in philosophy. . . is really more a working on oneself. On one’s own interpreta-
tion. On one’s own way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)” Wittgenstein (1977),
16e.
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The stubborn communitarian may retort that these passages do nothing to
show that Wittgenstein was concerned with the individual. When he advises a
change in way of life, they may suggest, he is speaking to the collective or com-
munity. There’s nothing to suggest otherwise. But there is. Wittgenstein sounds
a thoroughly Nietzschean note in a 1944 comment. “That man,” he says, “will be
revolutionary who can revolutionize himself.”401 This comment is contemporane-
ous with the Philosophical Investigations and, thereby, with the collectivist’s and
communitarian’s textual evidence.
According to the reading I’ve been developing, the individual can revolu-
tionize herself if she changes the way she lives. As practice or regularity of behavior
fixes meaning, a change in practice will change our words, language, and world-
picture. What is needed is something like Millian experiments in living. Supposing
the individual passes on her new way of life and language to others, such a change
will literally change the world.402 Communitarian thinkers, on the other hand,
cannot even begin to account for this revolutionary Nietzschean comment.
The communitarian will retort that I cannot account for important passages
in Wittgenstein’s corpus. One such passage suggests that Wittgenstein envisioned
a highly conservative role for philosophy:
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it
can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is.403
401Wittgenstein (1977), 45e.
402There’s some very interesting work to be done here on the nature and dynamics of social
movements.
403Wittgenstein (1967), §124.
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Here Wittgenstein says that the role of philosophy is purely descriptive. Wittgen-
stein asserts that we cannot change meaning and thereby the world by philoso-
phizing. But I take my reading to be consistent with this conservative role for
philosophy. I am not suggesting that the individual can change meaning by engag-
ing in the conceptual project of philosophizing. Rather, I am suggesting that the
individual can change meaning by disrupting the regularities of behavior on which
meaning depends. I am suggesting she live di erently.
This section argued that language is not, conceptually speaking, essentially
social. Language is social as a matter of fact. We share a common language and
a world-picture. This common language sets us the same traps. In such cases, the
fact that we share a common language can make these problems look inevitable and
irresolvable. This is particularly problematic when our language and world-picture
cease to be useful in making sense of the world in which we find ourselves. But these
problems are not inevitable or irresolvable. Wittgenstein calls on the individual to
be something like the Nietzschean individual. The solution, Wittgenstein says, is
to change how one lives.
This chapter was concerned with the suggestion that a Wittgensteinian
view of language precludes the Nietzschean individual. An alternate reading of
Wittgenstein on rules and private language was o ered according to which activity,
not community behavior or consensus, is necessary for meaning. This alternate
reading, however, does not embrace the full-blown individualist reading of Hacker
and Baker. The fact is that our linguistic community plays an important role
in our experience. Our shared language leads us into the same traps. The fact
that we share this language makes the resulting problems appear inevitable and
121
irresolvable.
Wittgenstein once remarked that he didn’t wish to found a school of phi-
losophy. This reading suggests an explanation. His philosophy was a response
to a culturally troubled time. The world had changed such that the form of life
individuals had been given by society no longer met the demands of their lives.
They experienced their lives as deeply problematic. Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein
rejects the view that these problems are inevitable and irresolvable. Their source
lies in our language and culture. Their solution is the Nietzschean individual, that
individual with the courage to live di erently. Wittgenstein didn’t want to found
a school, then, because he hoped his philosophy would show us how to remove the
problems that motivated it. The next chapter will return to the question of the
fate of our individual caught in moment of culture crisis.
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CULTURE CRISIS REVISITED
This thesis was concerned with the phenomenon of culture crisis. In particular,
this thesis asked whether there was anything the individual could do to resolve the
problem of culture crisis in her own case. Initially, I characterized culture crisis as
a historical moment in which our culture comes apart from the practical realties
of our lives. In a moment of culture crisis our culture suddenly and radically no
longer helps us to make sense of the world in which we find ourselves. Our culture
leads us to expect one world, but we find ourselves in another.
In order to illustrate the problem of culture crisis, I used Generation Y’s
experience as an example. The 2008 Recession and its fall-out have indelibly and
irreversibly altered Generation Y’s experience. As I argued in the first chapter,
Generation Y expected to find itself in the world of Dilbert or Leslie Knope. Com-
parison of the films from 1999 and the television shows from 2009 shows that
Generation Y had begun to accept the bureau as the non-threatening background
of their lives. Generation Y’s picture of the good life took for granted that they
would have a place within a bureau and would be able to live modest and com-
fortable, if sometimes absurd lives.
The fall-out of the 2008 Recession has made this picture of the good life
unattainable. The members of Generation Y have adapted the picture to account
for some of the financial setbacks they’ve experienced. They are putting o  getting
married, buying houses, having kids and even simply buying a car. However, these
adaptations, importantly, do not question the essential features of the good life.
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Supposing the economy fails to return to something resembling its pre-Recession
state, this light adaptation will not be enough.
The culture crisis facing Generation Y threatens to doom its members to
living unfulfilled and unsatisfied lives. They remain in the grips of a pre-Recession
picture of the good life, but live in a post-Recession world. What the members of
Generation Y need is a picture of the good life that can help them navigate the
post-Recession world. Given that culture is a collective creation, the problem of
culture crisis ultimately requires a collective solution. However, collective solutions
take time whereas the individual has a life to live right now. This thesis asked if
there was anything the individual could to do resolve this problem in her own case.
I argued in the second chapter that we need something like a Wittgen-
steinian view of language to even make sense of the phenomenon of culture crisis.
According to this view, language is not an instrument of science. Rather, language
is an activity. Our concepts get their meaning from their relation to our activities
or form of life. Taken as a whole, our concepts form a world-picture which is the
socially inherited background of our judgements and beliefs. It shapes how we see
and act in the world.
On a Wittgensteinian understanding of language, many of our concepts are
unbounded and governed by indefinite rules. Generally, we follow the rules of our
language easily. However, Wittgenstein suggests that we sometimes get trapped or
entangled in the rules of our language. We try to use our concepts in accordance
with their rules, but things do not go as we expect them to. In such cases we tend
to look for the problem in the wrong place. That is, we often fail to consider that
our concepts are the source of the problem.
The unbounded nature of our concepts on the Wittgensteinian view means
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that the rules governing them take for granted certain normal conditions. If these
conditions no longer hold, then the concept will no longer work as expected. This is
a reasonable explanation of the problem facing Generation Y. The pre-Recession
picture of the good life takes certain conditions for granted. These conditions
include things such as a growing economy and an abundance of mid-wage jobs, for
instance. However, these conditions no longer obtain in the post-Recession world.
The pre-Recession picture of the good life is, therefore, no longer a good concept.
If this is a good analysis of the problem facing Generation Y, then the solu-
tion lies in concept revision or creation. I argued in the third and fourth chapters
that the Nietzschean individual provides a model for our individual caught in a
moment of culture crisis. In the third chapter I gave a physio-psychological read-
ing of Nietzsche’s work according to which the decline of culture in late nineteenth
century Europe is a result of declining physio-psychological health. Broadly, the
problem Nietzsche sees is that the culture of late nineteenth century Europe does
not help individuals make sense of their lives. Rather than providing them ways to
endure and embrace the su ering that characterizes life, their culture denies that
life involves su ering. The solution to this cultural problem is the self-overcoming
Nietzschean individual.
In the fourth chapter I examined the notion of overcoming. As the Niet-
zschean individual is supposed to carry out a cultural revival via self-overcoming,
the notion of overcoming is central to Nietzsche’s project. I argued that a coherent
and non-metaphorical understanding of overcoming rests on Nietzsche’s neglected
and underdeveloped view of language. According to this view, we give form and
order to ourselves and the world via the creation and application of concepts. Niet-
zsche characterizes our concepts as an interpretation of our experience, especially
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our physio-psychological experience. The interpretation we create is driven by
power struggles between di erent segments of society and enforced through moral
imperative. Nonetheless, Nietzsche believes all concepts, not just the moral, are
human interpretations which give form and order to our diverse and multidudinous
experience.
The Nietzschean individual, then, is supposed to carry out a cultural revival
by engaging in concept revision and creation. She is supposed to give a new
interpretation. Realizing that concepts are a human creation, the Nietzschean
individual does not remain passively within the confines of the concepts she was
given, but rather realizes her nature as a creative animal and overcomes. She
rejects the collective form of life and is, thereby, able to generate new concepts.
I suggested at the end of the fourth chapter that Nietzsche’s view of lan-
guage shares its central insight with Wittgenstein’s view. In the fifth chapter I
considered the challenge that a Wittgensteinian view of language precludes the
Nietzschean individual. This challenge rests upon a collectivist or communitarian
reading of Wittgenstein on language and rules. Such readings hold that language is
essentially social and the individual is insu cient to determine meaning for herself.
As such, the individual cannot engage in concept revision and creation. I argued
that this reading is unsupported by the text. According to Wittgenstein, regular-
ity in activity is necessary for meaning, not collective or communal agreement in
behavior. Indeed, Wittgenstein even seems to call for the Nietzschean individual.
The overall suggestion of this thesis, then, is that to resolve the problem
of culture crisis in her own case, the individual needs to be like the Nietzschean
individual. Once she has recognized that the problem facing her is that her picture
or concept of the good life is not longer a good one, she must overcome and, thereby,
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give herself a new concept. This suggestion is unlikely to find many sympathetic
ears as traditional interpretation suggests that the thought of these thinkers is
either irrelevant to incompatible with each other.
However, the suggestion of the fourth and fifth chapters is that Wittgen-
stein’s and Nietzsche’s work is not incompatible or even radically di erent. Rather,
they were both concerned with the question of cultural decline, its sources, symp-
toms, and solution. Both thinkers appeal to the individual, trying to shake her free
of the picture or perspective that holds her captive. Nietzsche employed his tal-
ent to articulate the problem of culture and identified overcoming as the solution.
Wittgenstein employed his talent to explore the nature of language and saw that
something like his view of language was necessary to make sense of this problem
and its solution.
This commonality in purpose explains certain aspects of these thinkers’
works. If Wittgenstein was concerned with culture and the human condition, as
this comparison suggests, then we can make sense of his frequent comments re-
garding religion, war, progress, and culture. Additionally, this helps us make sense
of the ethical dimension of the Tractatus. As Bearn suggests, Wittgenstein saw
an intimate connection between the nature of language and the human condition.
This thesis suggests that this connection remains in his later thought as well. On
the other hand, comparing Nietzsche with Wittgenstein helps resolve long-standing
interpretive issues regarding his views on language, truth, and overcoming.
With these sources of incompatibility out of the way, the individual is free
to resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. The problem of culture
crisis is a conceptual problem. It is an instance of conceptual failure. The pre-
Recession concept of the good life is no longer a good one because the normal
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conditions it takes for granted no longer obtain. Though the problem of culture
crisis is conceptual, its solution is not. The solution, as Wittgenstein suggests is
to change how one lives. Our individual must create a new or significantly revised
form of life to serve as the basis of a revised language and world-picture.
It is important to note, however, that this is not meant to be a solution to
be a universal solution to the problem facing Generation Y. The aim of this thesis
is much more limited. The question was whether there is anything the individual
can do to resolve the problem in her own case. The suggestion coming out of
this thesis is that there is. Even so, not every individual member of Generation
Y will be able to pursue this solution because it requires the individual be both
a philosopher and a Nietzschean individual. That is, the individual must both be
able to recognize the conceptual nature of the problem and also have the strength
of will to live di erently. This is an exceedingly rare individual.
The solution to the problem facing Generation Y as a whole, then, does
not lie immediately in the process of overcoming. This is something that the rare
individual undertakes. However, as I suggested in the third chapter, Nietzsche
believed these individuals would have a profound and far-reaching e ect upon
culture and the world. The world, he said, “revolves about the inventor of new
values: imperceptibly it revolves.”404 He is, characteristically, not explicit about
what he means by this. However, I think it likely that he imagines the Nietzschean
individual to be something like a tastemaker. They set an example through their
way of living which others imitate. The imitators’ actions themselves have knock-
on e ects. The Nietzschean individual’s actions, thereby, initiate a cultural revival.
The conclusion of this thesis is cautiously optimistic. It is, conceptually
404Nietzsche (1969), 78.
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speaking, possible for the individual to resolve the problem of culture crisis in
her own case. The members of Generation Y are not, necessarily, fated to live
unsatisfied and unfulfilling lives because they remain in the grips of a pre-Recession
picture of the good life. However, the individuals with the ability to develop a
picture of the good life better suited to the post-Recession world are exceedingly
rare. Despite this conceptual possibility, then, the majority of Generation Y are
likely fated to pretend that the pre-Recession picture of the good life is still a good
picture.
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